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MVP vs. the Ayalas: PLDT and Globe confront the debt of the 5G era

 

In Philippine telecoms, the contest between Manny Pangilinan’s PLDT and the Ayalas’ Globe is no longer only about whose network is faster, whose fiber reaches farther, or whose mobile brand occupies more Filipino pockets. It is increasingly a quieter struggle: who can carry the heavy debt of the 5G and fiber era with less strain? The first-quarter 2026 numbers show two giants trying to normalize after years of capital intensity. PLDT remains the larger machine, with ₱56.5bn in revenues and ₱28.3bn in EBITDA, against Globe’s ₱45.7bn in revenues and ₱22.2bn in EBITDA. Yet size is not the same as comfort. PLDT’s earnings engine is bigger, but its leverage and liquidity metrics look more stretched. Globe, smaller but nimbler, presents the cleaner deleveraging story.

PLDT’s advantage is obvious at first glance. Its EBITDA base of ₱28.3bn in the first quarter exceeded Globe’s ₱22.2bn, giving Pangilinan’s group a broader cash-profit cushion to absorb interest, lease, depreciation, and network spending. Its consolidated revenues rose 2% year on year to ₱56.5bn, while service revenues rose 3% to ₱54.9bn. Globe, by contrast, posted faster growth—revenues up 4% and service revenues up 5%—but from a smaller base. In brute operating scale, PLDT still towers.

The more interesting comparison lies below EBITDA. PLDT’s reported financing-cost burden appears lighter: financing costs-net were around ₱4.31bn against EBITDA of ₱28.3bn, or roughly 15% of quarterly EBITDA. Globe reported finance costs of around ₱4.38bn, while broader financing costs were cited at ₱6.39bn, against EBITDA of ₱22.2bn—a heavier apparent burden depending on which finance-cost line one uses. On this measure alone, PLDT looks more efficient at carrying debt. But the balance-sheet ratios complicate the story.

Globe’s debt metrics are cleaner. Its net debt-to-EBITDA stood at 2.17x, below PLDT’s 2.53x. Its gross debt-to-EBITDA was 2.61x, slightly better than PLDT’s 2.65x. The gap becomes more striking in gearing: Globe’s net debt-to-equity was 1.03x, whereas PLDT’s net debt-to-equity ratio was 2.24x. Liquidity tells a similar tale. Globe’s current ratio was 0.81x; PLDT’s was only 0.42x. For creditors and equity investors alike, the conclusion is plain: PLDT has more EBITDA, but Globe has more breathing room.

Nor is Globe merely less levered; it is moving in the right direction faster. Globe’s total debt was about ₱251.2bn at the end of March 2026, down roughly 2% year to date, while PLDT’s interest-bearing financial liabilities were about ₱295.5bn, slightly higher than ₱295.0bn at the end of 2025. In other words, Globe is actually reducing the pile; PLDT is holding the line. That may sound like a small distinction, but in capital-intensive telecoms, the direction of debt matters. Investors do not only buy today’s ratios. They buy trajectories.

The capex picture reveals the strategic tension. Globe spent ₱12.7bn in cash capex in the first quarter, up 51% year on year, equivalent to around 30% of service revenues. PLDT’s cash outflow for property and equipment, including capitalized interest, was ₱12.4bn, down from ₱16.1bn a year earlier and equivalent to roughly 23% of service revenues. Globe is still investing hard. PLDT is spending less intensely. That does not necessarily mean PLDT is underinvesting; it may simply be exercising discipline after a long network buildout. But given PLDT’s weaker liquidity ratio and higher gearing, it appears more constrained in keeping capex lean.

The two companies’ business mixes also help explain the divergence. PLDT’s fixed-line business remains formidable, with fixed-line revenues of ₱33.9bn and fixed-line service revenues of ₱33.9bn in the quarter. Its wireless service revenues were ₱24.6bn, with mobile data still growing but legacy voice under pressure. Globe, meanwhile, has become a cleaner data-growth story: 91% of consolidated service revenues came from data-driven services, while mobile data grew 11% year on year and home broadband revenues rose 6%. The Ayalas’ telco is less dominant in the fixed-line segment, but its revenue mix increasingly resembles the future rather than the past.

There is also the matter of adjacencies. Globe’s stake in Mynt, the parent of GCash, contributed ₱1.9bn in equity earnings in the first quarter, accounting for around 30% of Globe’s pre-tax income. That gives Globe a second engine—fintech profits—to support the telecom balance sheet. PLDT has its own digital interests, including MIH and Kayana-related exposures, and recorded a higher equity share in the net earnings of associates and joint ventures. But Globe’s GCash linkage is now a more visible part of its earnings narrative.

For shareholders, the contrast is almost philosophical. Pangilinan’s PLDT offers scale, a larger EBITDA base, and a lower apparent financing-cost burden. It is the bigger fortress, but one with thicker debt walls. The Ayalas’ Globe offers faster service revenue growth, better leverage ratios, stronger liquidity metrics, and clearer evidence of debt reduction. It is the smaller fortress, but with cleaner lines of retreat, should markets tighten.

The battle to stabilize telecom debt will not be won in a single quarter. Both companies remain profitable, both generate large cash flows, and both still operate in a market hungry for data. But the first quarter of 2026 suggests a changing hierarchy of financial comfort. PLDT can point to heft: more EBITDA, more revenue, more fixed-line scale. Globe can point to repair: lower leverage, better liquidity, and faster deleveraging. In a sector where yesterday’s network arms race became today’s balance-sheet headache, that may prove the more compelling story.

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.

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