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The Gokongwei and Ayala REITs vs. the BSP Regime Change

  Why did AREIT and RCR fall from their 2022 peaks without their businesses collapsing? In the early months of 2022, Philippine REITs looked like the elegant answer to an ugly investing problem. Cash yielded little. Bonds were still emerging from the long shadow of pandemic-era monetary easing. Equity investors, battered by uncertainty, wanted dividends that looked contractual and tenants that looked durable. Into that world came two of the country’s most watched property-income vehicles: AREIT , the Ayala-backed pioneer, and RCR , the Gokongwei-backed newcomer. Both were office-heavy, sponsor-supported, and dividend-paying. Both were bid up to prices that, in hindsight, depended less on perfection in property than on permanence in interest rates. AREIT climbed to roughly ₱52–₱53 per share around March–April 2022, while RCR had earlier surged from its ₱6.45 IPO price to a reported high of about ₱8.80 . RCR’s IPO had been well received, with reports of oversubscription and strong ...
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The Rentier’s Paradox: AREIT, Ayala’s Yield Machine, vs. the BSP’s Tight-Money Era

  AREIT’s first-quarter numbers were sturdy. Its share price may still have to argue with the bond market. In property, as in politics, timing can make competent management look brilliant—or merely adequate. AREIT, the Ayala-backed real-estate investment trust, has delivered the sort of first-quarter report that income investors usually like: more revenue, more profit, and another fat cheque for shareholders. Yet the market’s response to such news may be more muted than the numbers deserve. In a world where safer yields have risen, even a well-run landlord must now compete harder for capital. For the three months to March 2026, AREIT’s revenue rose by 21% , from ₱2.92bn to ₱3.54bn . Net income climbed 25% , from ₱2.05bn to ₱2.56bn . Distributable income, the key figure for a REIT investor, also came in at ₱2.56bn , matching reported net income. The company’s latest quarterly dividend of ₱0.62 per share implies an annualized payout of ₱2.48 , or about 6.36% at a share price of r...

Pizza Wars: FCG vs. PIZZA Jan to Mar 2026 results

  In the Philippines’ crowded casual-dining market, Figaro’s smaller pizza empire looked sharper than Shakey’s larger machine In the restaurant trade, size is meant to confer advantages. Bigger chains buy cheaper cheese, bargain harder with landlords, and spread marketing pesos across more stores. Yet the first quarter of 2026 offered a reminder that scale is not the same as momentum. In the latest round of the Philippines’ pizza wars, Shakey’s Pizza Asia Ventures , listed as PIZZA , remained the heavyweight. It booked ₱4.0bn in revenue and ₱133.8m in net income for January to March 2026. But the nimble challenger, Figaro Culinary Group , or FCG , looked more efficient: it grew revenue faster, expanded gross profit more strongly, and delivered much fatter margins. FCG’s revenue rose 14.9% year on year to ₱1.50bn , while PIZZA’s revenue rose about 13% to ₱4.00bn . The contrast is striking because both companies are chasing similar appetites. PIZZA owns a portfolio built around S...

Shakey’s dividend dilemma: when the bill comes due

For years, Shakey’s Pizza Asia Ventures Inc. looked like the sort of consumer company income investors could warm to: familiar brands, expanding outlets, improving scale, and a dividend that had recovered from pandemic-era caution. The company paid ₱0.10 per share in 2023 , then doubled the payout to ₱0.20 per share in 2024 , and maintained that level in 2025 . Its own filing lists the 2025 cash dividend at ₱0.20 per share , totaling about ₱336.8m in cash distributions.  Yet the latest quarterly figures suggest that shareholders hoping for another increase may be getting ahead of themselves. Indeed, a more uncomfortable possibility has entered the conversation: Shakey’s may not merely refrain from raising its dividend; it may decide that preserving cash is the more prudent course. The reason is simple. A large bill is coming due. At the heart of the matter is the company’s BDO loan , with an outstanding balance of around ₱3.55bn as of March 31, 2026. The loan has been reclassified...

The Pizza Engine Inside Figaro

  In the Philippine food business, growth often arrives wrapped in cheese, discounts, and delivery fees. Figaro Culinary Group, Inc. seems to understand this better than most. In the quarter ended March 31, 2026, the company’s revenue climbed to ₱1.496bn , up 14.9% from a year earlier, while nine-month revenue rose 13.5% to ₱4.697bn . The expansion story remains intact. But the more interesting question is not whether FCG is growing. It is whether that growth is becoming more expensive to produce. The answer, for now, is yes. Gross profit in the March quarter rose 16.0% to ₱674.0m , nudging gross margin upward to 45.1% from 44.6% a year earlier. For the nine-month period, gross margin improved more meaningfully, to 46.6% from 44.2% . On the surface, that is encouraging: the company is selling more while keeping direct costs under reasonable control. But below the gross-profit line, the picture becomes less flattering. Operating expenses in the quarter rose 18.2% , faster than...

The Tycoon, the Telco and the Newsroom: Salvador “Buddy” Zamora II’s PT&T-Rappler Play

  Salvador Zamora II’s quiet attempt to turn a distressed telco and a digital-media beachhead into a new platform of influence In the Philippine business sector, tycoons tend to prefer hard assets: mines, ports, power plants, property, and pipelines. Salvador “Buddy” Zamora II , long associated with mining, energy, and industrial ventures, now appears to be edging into a more intangible but potentially more powerful domain: connectivity, cybersecurity, and media distribution . Through his seat at PT&T Corp. , and through the broader Menlo Capital orbit associated with Salvador Zamora and Benjamin Bitanga , he has become linked to two assets that sit close to the nerve center of the modern economy: PT&T , a rehabilitating telecommunications company, and Rappler , a digital-media company in which Menlo-linked interests have been reported to hold exposure. The temptation is to call this a comeback story. It is better understood as an option. PT&T is not yet a challen...

DITO, the Philippines’ third telco, is being carried by debt, supplier credit, shareholder advances, and investor patience.

  In telecoms, coverage is not the same as solvency. DITO Telecommunity, the Philippines’ third mobile operator, has done the hard visible work: it has built a national network, sold SIMs, added subscribers, and inserted itself into a market once shared comfortably by two incumbents. But the latest public filings of its listed parent, DITO CME Holdings Corp. , show a company still being carried less by profits than by debt, supplier credit, shareholder advances, and investor patience . For the nine months ended September 30, 2025 , DITO CME reported revenue of ₱14.92 billion , but a net loss of ₱24.93 billion . Its capital deficiency widened to ₱95.31 billion , from ₱73.39 billion at the end of 2024. The top line is the part management can point to. Revenue rose from ₱11.89 billion in the first nine months of 2024 to ₱14.92 billion in the same period of 2025, a rise of roughly 25.5% . Service revenue accounted for almost all of it, at ₱14.50 billion . This is evidence of commerc...