Skip to main content

Posts

Injap Sia’s MerryMart Reckoning

DoubleDragon’s tender offer gives MM shareholders an exit. For many, it also turns a paper loss into something harder to ignore. When MerryMart Consumer Corp. listed in June 2020, the pitch was simple, timely, and seductive: a home-grown grocery chain, backed by Edgar “Injap” Sia II’s reputation for scaling Mang Inasal, would ride the pandemic-era appetite for essential retail and roll out a national network of stores. The company sold 1.594bn primary shares at ₱1.00 apiece , raising about ₱1.6bn in gross proceeds , with the proceeds earmarked for store expansion, distribution centers, and working capital. There were no selling shareholders in the IPO; this was a growth-capital story, not an exit.  Six years later, that story has been repriced. DoubleDragon Corporation has launched a tender offer for MerryMart shares at ₱0.48 per share , following its planned acquisition of 2.658bn MM shares , or 35% of MerryMart, from Injap Investments Inc. The tender offer covers up to 4.937bn s...
Recent posts

SM Prime vs. Ayala Land: Two Property Giants, One Slump, Unequal Pain

  At SM Prime, the slowdown is a bruise. At Ayala Land, it is closer to the bone. The Philippine property cycle has turned less forgiving. But the pain is not being distributed evenly. In the first quarter of 2026, SM Prime Holdings and Ayala Land both showed the same basic symptom: weaker real-estate development sales. Yet their accounts tell very different stories. At SM Prime, the slump is being muffled by malls. At Ayala Land, it is moving quickly from the income statement to the cash flow statement and into the balance sheet. SM Prime’s real-estate sales fell to ₱7.76bn in Q1 2026 from ₱9.22bn a year earlier, a decline of roughly 16% . But rent rose to ₱21.61bn from ₱20.02bn , allowing total revenue to inch up to ₱33.28bn  while net income remained almost unchanged at ₱11.87bn . In other words, the developer inside SM Prime coughed; the landlord kept breathing.  Ayala Land’s figures are more exposed to the weather. Its real estate revenue fell to ₱36.25bn from ₱...

Max’s Group Q1 2026 Results: Lean Cuisine

  The Filipino restaurant group is learning to do more with less. Investors now want proof that discipline can become cash. For years, restaurant chains in emerging markets were judged by a simple metric: how many new stores they could open. Bigger footprints meant bigger brands, and bigger brands promised operating leverage. Max’s Group, Inc. — the operator behind Max’s Restaurant, Pancake House, Yellow Cab, Krispy Kreme, and other familiar names — is now telling a different story. In the first quarter of 2026, the company’s pitch was not expansion, but discipline. The numbers bear that out. Systemwide sales inched up by 1.1% to ₱4.3 billion , while consolidated revenues rose 2.0% to ₱2.87 billion . Same-store sales growth remained positive at 4.2% , even as the group operated with a leaner store network. Management framed this as the product of a “disciplined approach toward quality and productivity” rather than a race to add outlets.  That is the encouraging part of the q...

The Ayalas’ Land Machine Slows as Inventory Swells

  The Philippines’ premier property developer has long been admired for turning land into townships and townships into cash. But in early 2026, the cash machine began to look more like a warehouse. Ayala Land’s balance sheet is, in one sense, a monument to patience. Property companies do not sell widgets. They acquire land, wait, build, wait some more, then sell, lease, or recycle capital through vehicles such as REITs. In good times, inventory is not deadweight; it is embedded optionality. But when demand slows, that same inventory can become a reminder that real estate is a business of duration, leverage, and confidence. At the end of March 2026, Ayala Land carried ₱241.3bn of real estate inventories , up from ₱239.3bn at the end of 2025. The quarterly increase, less than 1%, is not by itself dramatic. The more interesting point is the size: inventories represented roughly a quarter of total assets and more than half of current assets. For a developer of Ayala Land’s scale, this...

The Gokongwei and Ayala REITs vs. the BSP Regime Change

  Why did AREIT and RCR fall from their 2022 peaks without their businesses collapsing? In the early months of 2022, Philippine REITs looked like the elegant answer to an ugly investing problem. Cash yielded little. Bonds were still emerging from the long shadow of pandemic-era monetary easing. Equity investors, battered by uncertainty, wanted dividends that looked contractual and tenants that looked durable. Into that world came two of the country’s most watched property-income vehicles: AREIT , the Ayala-backed pioneer, and RCR , the Gokongwei-backed newcomer. Both were office-heavy, sponsor-supported, and dividend-paying. Both were bid up to prices that, in hindsight, depended less on perfection in property than on permanence in interest rates. AREIT climbed to roughly ₱52–₱53 per share around March–April 2022, while RCR had earlier surged from its ₱6.45 IPO price to a reported high of about ₱8.80 . RCR’s IPO had been well received, with reports of oversubscription and strong ...

The Rentier’s Paradox: AREIT, Ayala’s Yield Machine, vs. the BSP’s Tight-Money Era

  AREIT’s first-quarter numbers were sturdy. Its share price may still have to argue with the bond market. In property, as in politics, timing can make competent management look brilliant—or merely adequate. AREIT, the Ayala-backed real-estate investment trust, has delivered the sort of first-quarter report that income investors usually like: more revenue, more profit, and another fat cheque for shareholders. Yet the market’s response to such news may be more muted than the numbers deserve. In a world where safer yields have risen, even a well-run landlord must now compete harder for capital. For the three months to March 2026, AREIT’s revenue rose by 21% , from ₱2.92bn to ₱3.54bn . Net income climbed 25% , from ₱2.05bn to ₱2.56bn . Distributable income, the key figure for a REIT investor, also came in at ₱2.56bn , matching reported net income. The company’s latest quarterly dividend of ₱0.62 per share implies an annualized payout of ₱2.48 , or about 6.36% at a share price of r...

Pizza Wars: FCG vs. PIZZA Jan to Mar 2026 results

  In the Philippines’ crowded casual-dining market, Figaro’s smaller pizza empire looked sharper than Shakey’s larger machine In the restaurant trade, size is meant to confer advantages. Bigger chains buy cheaper cheese, bargain harder with landlords, and spread marketing pesos across more stores. Yet the first quarter of 2026 offered a reminder that scale is not the same as momentum. In the latest round of the Philippines’ pizza wars, Shakey’s Pizza Asia Ventures , listed as PIZZA , remained the heavyweight. It booked ₱4.0bn in revenue and ₱133.8m in net income for January to March 2026. But the nimble challenger, Figaro Culinary Group , or FCG , looked more efficient: it grew revenue faster, expanded gross profit more strongly, and delivered much fatter margins. FCG’s revenue rose 14.9% year on year to ₱1.50bn , while PIZZA’s revenue rose about 13% to ₱4.00bn . The contrast is striking because both companies are chasing similar appetites. PIZZA owns a portfolio built around S...