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FGEN’s “poison pill”: Was Piki Lopez worried about barbarians at the gate?

  The most revealing feature of First Gen’s recent governance controversy is not the family drama. It is the architecture of control. In its clarification to the Philippine Stock Exchange, First Gen confirmed that its agreements with Prime Infrastructure contain Change of Management Control provisions that could force the company to sell its hydropower stake at a 25 percent discount , worth about ₱15.5bn , and could also expose its remaining gas-plant stake to a further ~₱8bn discount if Prime Infra exercises that right. In corporate language, that is not a trivial covenant. It is a deterrent with teeth. And whatever label one prefers — “key man clause” or “poison pill” — it functions as a defense against a hostile reordering of control. Strictly speaking, First Gen’s clause is not a classic poison pill. It is not a shareholder-rights plan of the Delaware kind, where all investors except a hostile bidder get discounted shares once an ownership threshold is crossed. But in econom...
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The Gotianuns compound EastWest's dividend by 19% p.a. from 2022 to 2026

  The quiet compounding machine In Philippine banking, dividends rarely make for gripping prose. Balance sheets matter more than bravado; prudence beats spectacle. Yet at East West Banking Corporation, the Gotianun family’s mid‑tier lender, the numbers are beginning to speak with unusual clarity. From 2022 to 2026, EastWest’s regular cash dividend rose from ₱0.40 per share to ₱0.82 , implying a compound annual growth rate of roughly 19.7% . That is not a one‑off windfall, but a four‑year pattern. The more interesting question is whether the bank’s fundamentals, as laid bare in its 2025 Annual Report , genuinely justify such compounding—or whether the dividend is merely running ahead of the balance sheet. The evidence suggests the former. From caution to confidence The early years tell a restrained story. In 2022 , EastWest paid ₱0.40 per share , equivalent to total cash dividends of roughly ₱900 million , at a time when net income stood at ₱4.6 billion . The payout was conservative...

From consolidation to zero: how ABS-CBN vanished from Lopez Holdings’ balance sheet

The Lopez family’s listed holding company has, over little more than a decade, transformed ABS-CBN from a fully consolidated operating subsidiary into an associate carried at zero on a consolidated equity-accounting basis — a shift that says as much about accounting architecture as it does about the fall of one of the Philippines’ best-known media groups.   There was a time when ABS-CBN sat squarely inside Lopez Holdings’ numbers. In its 2025 annual report, Lopez Holdings explicitly recalls that ABS-CBN had been treated as a subsidiary in 2012 and prior years , meaning its revenues, costs, debt, and losses flowed line by line through the parent’s consolidated accounts. That changed after the adoption of PFRS 10 , when Lopez Holdings said it reassessed control and concluded that it did not control ABS-CBN but did control First Philippine Holdings. From   January 1, 2013 , the group deconsolidated ABS-CBN and began accounting for it under the equity method .  That accounti...

PhilWeb’s Q1 2026 Turnaround in the Wake of Greggy Araneta’s Exit

  For much of the past few years, PhilWeb looked like a company trapped between eras. Its legacy business—built around electronic gaming sites, service-provider arrangements, and venue-linked operations—was still generating cash, but less of it. Revenue fell from ₱816.1m in 2023 to ₱774.6m in 2024 , then again to ₱659.4m in 2025 . EBITDA deteriorated from ₱88.1m in 2023 to ₱51.5m in 2024 and then to just ₱9.3m in 2025 . The company remained loss-making, reporting a net loss of ₱71.8m in 2023 , a far larger ₱599.2m loss in 2024 , and a still substantial ₱211.2m loss in 2025 . By the end of that year, the message from the numbers was plain enough: the old model was not collapsing outright, but it was plainly weakening.  The annual report explains why. Management attributed the decline in 2025 revenue to the closure of non-performing sites, intensifying competition from integrated resort casinos, and the spread of alternative online gaming providers. The figures show that even...

ASLAG’s Profit Surge May Not Yet Lift Dividends

In the business of solar power, one learns quickly that not every dazzling number is created by sunshine alone. Raslag Corp. (ASLAG), a Philippine renewable-energy developer with four solar plants in Pampanga, reported that consolidated net profit surged to ₱509.4m in 2025 from ₱66.0m in 2024 , while revenue climbed to ₱723.7m from ₱438.9m . On the face of it, the result looks like the kind of operating inflection that growth investors dream of: a utility-scale solar platform finally beginning to show the earnings power of its expanding asset base. And indeed, part of the surge was operationally real. Raslag’s RASLAG-4 solar plant , with a capacity of 36.646 MWp , became a meaningful earnings contributor in 2025 after commercial operations began during the year; the company also expanded contracted sales through power-supply agreements, most notably the 10-year, 15MW PSA with PELCO I , which pushed contracted capacity to roughly 80% . Combined with a larger fleet—Raslag’s operating por...

Margin Wars: ABS-CBN’s 16.52% vs GMA7’s 50.97%, The New Economics of Philippine TV

The most revealing number in Philippine media is not ratings, subscriber counts, or YouTube views. It is the share of each peso of revenue that survives the direct cost of making and delivering content. By that measure, the country’s two most storied television brands now inhabit very different worlds. In 2025,  GMA7 posted a gross profit margin of 50.97% , down only slightly from 52.37% in 2024. ABS-CBN managed 16.52% , a touch above 16.18% a year earlier. In plain terms, GMA kept a little over 50 centavos of gross profit from every peso of revenue, while ABS kept only about 16.5 centavos .  That gulf is not a quirk of accounting. It is a map of two business models. GMA remains the Philippines’ dominant free-to-air broadcaster, still benefiting from the old but lucrative economics of mass television: national reach, ratings leadership, and an advertising machine that continues to throw off high-margin revenue. Its 2025 consolidated revenue rose to about ₱18.12bn , while gr...

GMA7 in a Declining TV Market—and a Declining Dividend Cycle

  For years, GMA Network looked like the great exception in Philippine television: the dominant free-to-air broadcaster, the perennial ratings leader, and a company whose dividends could make even indifferent investors pay attention. Yet its 2025 annual report suggests that the broader malaise afflicting television is no longer merely an industry abstraction. It is showing up in GMA7’s own numbers—most clearly in the slow erosion of its core recurring television advertising business , the economic engine that still powers the company.  That matters because television is not collapsing in one dramatic lurch. It is being worn down by habit. Filipino audiences are spending more time online, on social platforms, and with streaming and short-form video, even as broadcasters continue to command mass reach. Dentsu’s 2025 media trends report says 90% of Filipinos use the internet daily and 82% use social media every day , while broader industry analysis points to digital media taking...