Skip to main content

Posts

Inside Cosco Capital’s Portfolio, a Strategic Subic Fuel Terminal

By April 2026, the Philippine fuel story had stopped being a matter of routine weekly pump-price notices and had become something more structural: a test of logistics, storage, and staying power. On March 25, the government declared a national energy emergency, citing a threat to the fuel supply, while officials said the country had roughly 45 days of fuel at current consumption levels . Days later, oil firms announced yet another round of hikes— the fourth consecutive week —including a ₱12.50 per liter increase in diesel and a ₱2.50 per liter increase in gasoline from some retailers. In Metro Manila, benchmark prices by April 5 were still painfully high, with diesel averaging about ₱133.18 per liter and RON 91 gasoline about ₱90.95 per liter .  In such moments, infrastructure that is ordinarily invisible becomes newly legible. A tank farm is no longer just a collection of steel cylinders behind a fence; it is optionality in physical form. That is what makes Cosco Capital’s owne...
Post a Comment
Read more
Recent posts

Lopez, Gokongwei, Gatchalian, Romualdez: The PCIBank Boardroom Drama

  By early 1999, PCIBank had become more than one of the Philippines’ largest lenders; it had become a test of whether a major bank could remain stable when its ownership rested on a fragile balance between two business clans. Publicly accessible historical sources identify Eugenio Lopez Jr. as chairman and John Gokongwei Jr. as vice-chairman of PCIBank before the sale to Equitable, showing that the institution was effectively run through a dual-center power structure at the top.  What happened beneath that formal structure is harder to document with certainty. It was allegedly governed by a shareholder arrangement between the Lopez and Gokongwei groups that allowed the two camps to share control of PCIBank, with Mr Lopez as chairman and Mr Gokongwei, though vice-chairman, allegedly exercising influence through the bank’s executive committee. We have not found the actual shareholder agreement in the public sources reviewed here, so that part of the story should be trea...
Post a Comment
Read more

Lopez Holdings: The House That Debt Built—and Discipline Saved

  The long rise, stumble, and reinvention of Lopez Holdings In the Philippines, conglomerates often resemble republics: sprawling, dynastic, and convinced that history is on their side. Few have embodied that truth as vividly as Lopez Holdings , the listed flagship of one of the country’s most storied business families. Born in 1993 as Benpres Holdings Corporation, it was meant to be the Lopez clan’s public wager on a democratic Philippines finally ready to modernize—through television, phones, toll roads, water pipes, and power plants. For a time, it looked like a masterstroke. Then it became a cautionary tale. And then, by a mixture of stubbornness, asset quality, and financial surgery, it turned into something rarer: a survivor. At birth, Benpres had the swagger of the age. The early 1990s were years when investors, local and foreign, believed that the Philippines—newly emerged from dictatorship and eager for liberalisation—was finally ready to catch up with its more indust...
Post a Comment
Read more

ICTSI: The Merchant of Quays

From a Manila privatization to a far-flung empire of ports, International Container Terminal Services, Inc. has spent nearly four decades proving that gritty infrastructure, intelligently financed, can be a fine business—even when the world is coming apart.   International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) began life on December 24th, 1987, a newly formed Philippine company created to operate the Manila International Container Terminal (MICT), the country’s main box port. In May 1988 it won the original 25-year concession for MICT, and after further investment the franchise was extended to May 18th 2038—a reminder that the firm’s first great insight was that ports are not merely assets, but long contracts on a nation’s commerce. ICTSI was listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange on March 23rd, 1992, at ₱6.70 a share, turning a domestic infrastructure operator into a publicly traded wager on trade, efficiency, and managerial nerve. From the start, the company’s strategy was u...
Post a Comment
Read more

4Q25 Showed Why DigiPlus Could No Longer Command a Growth Premium

DigiPlus did not end 2025 with a crisis of solvency. It ended the year with something more damaging in public markets: a crisis of narrative. The company still reported roughly ₱84.2bn in revenue for 2025 , up 12 percent from the prior year; it still generated about ₱14.2bn in EBITDA ; and it still delivered around ₱12.6bn in net income , essentially flat year on year rather than sharply lower. It also closed the year with approximately ₱23.4bn in cash and cash equivalents and relatively modest debt, hardly the balance sheet of a distressed enterprise. Yet markets do not merely value what a company has earned; they value how durable, scalable, and politically resilient those earnings appear to be. On that test, DigiPlus’ fourth quarter was a disappointment. In 4Q25, revenue fell about 27 percent year on year to ₱17.3bn, EBITDA dropped about 32 percent to ₱3.1bn, and net income declined roughly 36 percent to ₱2.5bn. Management attributed the weakness to the continued fallout from ...
Post a Comment
Read more

The trend in $WLCON’s 2025 results has changed the way the market values the company

  WLCON still sells screws, tiles and taps. What it no longer sells, at least to the market, is the easy romance of premium growth.   There is a brutal clarity to retail numbers when the music changes. Wilcon Depot’s 2025 results were not disastrous: net sales rose 3.7 per cent to ₱35.44bn , gross profit still increased to ₱13.68bn , and the company ended the year with 104 stores after adding new locations. Yet net income slipped 3.3 percent to ₱2.446bn, while same-store sales declined 0.3 percent for the full year and the core Depot format — which accounts for 96.3 percent of sales — managed only flat same-store growth.  That combination matters more than the headline sales line. Investors will tolerate a modest decline in profit if they believe it is the temporary price of future scale. They are less forgiving when sales growth comes chiefly from opening more stores while the existing estate merely treads water. Wilcon’s own disclosures say full-year growth was driven...
Post a Comment
Read more

How Henry Sy’s shoe-store instinct became SM Investments—one of Southeast Asia’s most formidable consumer empires

There is a certain kind of businessman who builds by acquisition, and another who builds by intuition. Henry Sy, Sr. belonged to the latter camp. When he opened a small shoe store in downtown Manila in 1958, he was not laying out a conglomerate strategy. He was watching customers—how they moved, what they wanted, what convenience meant in a country where modern retail was still a novelty. That instinct, more than any spreadsheet, became the foundation of SM Investments Corporation, the holding company that now sits at the center of retail, property, banking and a growing portfolio of strategic bets in logistics, energy and consumer businesses. By 2024, SM described itself as an “ecosystem of businesses,” but the phrase understates the scale of what was built: a company that has become inseparable from the routines of modern Filipino life.  From the beginning, Sy’s genius was not just in selling products, but in recognizing patterns before the market fully named them. Shoemart intro...
Post a Comment
Read more