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Razon’s MWC vs. Pangilinan’s MYNLD: A Revenue-and-Capex Rivalry Takes Shape

 


Manila Water won the first-half revenue race through higher tariffs, while Maynilad relied more on rising billed volume and falling water losses. Their capital strategies reveal an even deeper divide: acquisition-led water security versus aggressive organic infrastructure expansion.

The rivalry between Enrique Razon Jr.-backed Manila Water Co. (PSE: MWC) and Manuel V. Pangilinan-chaired Maynilad Water Services (PSE: MYNLD) is emerging as a contest between two distinctly different utility strategies.

In the first half of 2026, Manila Water recorded ₱22.19 billion in operating revenue, up 11% from ₱20.00 billion a year earlier. Maynilad generated ₱19.11 billion, an increase of 4.1% from ₱18.35 billion. Manila Water therefore added about ₱2.19 billion of revenue—nearly three times Maynilad’s roughly ₱761 million increase. 

But revenue growth tells only half the story. Manila Water and Maynilad are also directing capital toward different sources of future growth. Manila Water has reduced its regular project spending after making a leveraged strategic investment in the Wawa bulk-water platform. Maynilad, by contrast, is accelerating organic investment in treatment plants, pipelines, wastewater facilities and network-loss reduction.

MWC won on price

Manila Water’s first-half advantage was predominantly tariff-driven.

In the East Zone, the average tariff increased 11% to ₱66.30 per cubic meter, while billed volume rose just 0.4% to 262.7 million cubic meters. Revenue from the combined East Zone, head office and Wawa operations increased 12% to ₱17.86 billion

The increase reflected Manila Water’s scheduled rate-rebasing adjustment, inflation adjustment, and a higher environmental charge. Effective January 1, 2026, the company implemented a 6.96% rate-rebasing adjustment and a 0.68% CPI adjustment. The environmental charge also rose to 30% from 25% after the company achieved the required sewer-coverage milestone. 

The higher rates flowed efficiently through Manila Water’s established network. Consolidated revenue rose 11%, while cash costs and expenses increased only 6%. EBITDA advanced 13% to ₱16.41 billion, and the EBITDA margin reached approximately 74%

Manila Water thus needed little additional consumption to produce double-digit growth. The company charged more for nearly the same volume of water and converted much of the incremental revenue into operating profit.

MYNLD won on water efficiency

Maynilad’s growth was more operationally driven.

The company’s average all-in tariff increased only about 1.3% to ₱67.07 per cubic meter, but billed volume rose 2.9% to 280.8 million cubic meters. Billed connections increased 1.6% to approximately 1.59 million. 

Maynilad’s nonrevenue-water ratio fell to 29.7% from 35.25%. The improvement meant that more of the water entering its distribution system reached customers and produced revenue. The company attributed the gains to leak detection, pipe replacement, network rehabilitation, and optimization of district-metered areas.

Maynilad sold more water even as total water supplied declined 4.9%. That is the essence of its growth model: recover water previously lost inside the network and convert it into billable volume without requiring an equivalent increase in raw-water supply. 

Maynilad’s EBITDA rose 7.5% to ₱13.70 billion, faster than its revenue, while its EBITDA margin improved to 71.7% from 69.4%. The company attributed the improvement partly to lower NRW and cost-control initiatives. 

First-half revenue scorecard

1H 2026Manila WaterMaynilad
Operating revenue₱22.19 billion₱19.11 billion
Revenue growth11.0%4.1%
Incremental revenue₱2.19 billion₱0.76 billion
Principal growth driverTariff increasesBilled volume and NRW reduction
Relevant billed-volume growthEast Zone: 0.4%2.9%
Average-tariff growthEast Zone: 11%Approximately 1.3%
EBITDA₱16.41 billion₱13.70 billion
EBITDA growth13%7.5%
EBITDA margin74%71.7%

MWC figures combine consolidated results with East Zone operating data; MYNLD figures use Maynilad’s consolidated results.

The capex rivalry: Build less after buying big, or build more from within?

The companies’ capital-expenditure strategies provide the clearest contrast.

Manila Water: lighter recurring capex after a major strategic acquisition

Manila Water reported approximately ₱6.8 billion of group capital expenditures in the first half, down 38% from the previous year. Around ₱5.7 billion, or 84%, was allocated to the East Zone and Wawa operations. Spending focused on wastewater expansion, network reliability, and water-supply projects required under its approved service-improvement plan. 

Lower spending helped Manila Water convert improved operating performance into stronger cash flow. But the reduction in regular capex shouldn’t be interpreted as strategic retreat. The company had already made a much larger capital-allocation decision: acquiring control of WawaJVCo, the developer and operator of the Wawa Bulk Water Supply Project.

Manila Water settled a ₱26.25 billion acquisition-related subscription payable in January 2026, largely using the proceeds of a new ₱27 billion, 15-year BDO loan. In economic terms, Manila Water has exchanged a portion of near-term organic capital spending for a large, leveraged investment in raw-water security and vertical integration. 

The Wawa strategy is intended to unite raw-water development with Manila Water’s existing treatment and East Zone distribution operations. The potential benefits include:

  • greater control over long-term raw-water supply;
  • less dependence on external bulk-water providers;
  • coordinated supply and distribution planning;
  • operating and procurement synergies; and
  • eventual recovery of eligible project costs through regulated tariffs. 

An indicative tariff adjustment of about 2.12% has been identified for January 1, 2028 for the initial recovery of Wawa project expenses, subject to the regulatory framework. The investment thesis therefore depends not only on water production, but also on the timing and extent of tariff recovery. 

Maynilad: an organic infrastructure surge

Maynilad is taking the opposite route. Rather than making a transformative acquisition, the company is deploying capital directly into its existing West Zone concession.

Maynilad reported ₱12.89 billion of capital expenditures in the first half, up 18.9% from ₱10.85 billion a year earlier. The spending supported water and wastewater infrastructure, production facilities, network reliability, customer-service programs, and projects designed to reduce water losses. 

That headline capex figure differs from the cash-flow statement’s ₱16.28 billion in additions to service-concession assets because the measures use different definitions and may treat capitalized borrowing costs, mobilization advances, project accruals, and noncash components differently. The key conclusion remains unchanged: Maynilad is running a substantially heavier construction program than Manila Water. 

Its capital investments are directly connected with its volume-growth strategy. Pipes replaced today can reduce future leaks. New treatment plants can increase supply resiliency. Wastewater projects expand regulatory coverage and enlarge the investment base that may earn an allowed return in future rate-rebasing exercises.

Maynilad estimated its interim regulatory cash position at approximately ₱183.5 billion at the end of June, reflecting accelerated investment since the start of the current rebasing period. The figure is indicative and remains subject to review and final determination by the MWSS Regulatory Office; it isn’t yet an approved regulatory asset or guaranteed recovery. 

Capex scorecard

1H 2026Manila WaterMaynilad
Company-reported capex₱6.8 billion₱12.89 billion
Year-over-year changeDown 38%Up 18.9%
Principal approachStrategic acquisition plus moderated organic capexAccelerated organic capex
Main investment themesWawa raw-water security, wastewater, network reliabilityNRW reduction, production facilities, water and wastewater expansion
Major strategic outlay₱26.25 billion Wawa acquisition-payment settlementNo comparable major acquisition
Main funding approachInternal cash and substantially higher debtIPO proceeds, Blue Bonds, internal cash and new loans
Principal execution riskWawa integration, leverage and tariff recoveryProject delivery, capex discipline and regulatory recovery

The reported capex measures aren’t perfectly comparable because the companies define and present concession investments differently. They nevertheless show a clear strategic divergence. 

What the capital strategies mean for cash flow

The two strategies produced sharply different reported cash-flow outcomes.

Manila Water generated ₱5.63 billion of reported operating cash flow, nearly double the year-earlier amount. That figure already deducted ₱6.07 billion of cash additions to service-concession assets. Excluding those concession investments, underlying operating cash inflow was approximately ₱11.70 billion.

After including roughly ₱995 million spent on property, equipment and software, Manila Water’s identifiable cash investment totaled approximately ₱7.07 billion. This suggests operating cash before concession investment exceeded current capital spending by about ₱4.63 billion.

Maynilad, by contrast, reported an operating cash outflow of ₱1.55 billion because its cash-flow statement deducted ₱16.28 billion of additions to service-concession assets. Adding that investment back produces operating cash before concession investment of approximately ₱14.73 billion—larger than Manila Water’s equivalent figure.

But Maynilad’s capital program exceeded that underlying cash generation. Including about ₱397 million of property-and-equipment purchases, identifiable cash investment reached approximately ₱16.67 billion, or around ₱1.94 billion more than pre-investment operating cash.

The comparison yields a nuanced conclusion:

Maynilad generated more cash before capex, but Manila Water retained more cash after capex because it spent far less on current projects.

Manila Water’s positive post-capex position came at the cost of a separate, debt-funded acquisition payment. Maynilad’s negative post-capex position resulted primarily from accelerated organic construction rather than weak core cash collections.

Funding two different bets

Maynilad’s expansion is supported by a much larger liquidity reserve. The company ended June with ₱23.98 billion of cash, approximately ₱14.09 billion of unused IPO proceeds, and nearly ₱2.95 billion of remaining Blue Bond proceeds. Its interest-bearing debt stood at approximately ₱103.55 billion.

Manila Water ended the period with only ₱4.58 billion of cash and approximately ₱161.56 billion of bank borrowings and bonds. The group raised ₱35.33 billion of new debt during the half, mainly to finance the Wawa acquisition payment and other capital requirements. 

That creates a second strategic distinction:

  • Manila Water has better current-period capex coverage but substantially higher leverage.
  • Maynilad has negative cash flow after capex but considerably greater liquidity and lower net financial debt.

Verdict

Razon’s Manila Water decisively won the first-half revenue-growth contest. Its 11% top-line increase, 13% EBITDA growth, and 74% margin show how powerfully a regulated tariff increase can flow through a mature, efficient distribution network.

Pangilinan’s Maynilad is pursuing a slower but more infrastructure-intensive growth model. Revenue rose only 4.1%, but billed volume and customer connections increased as NRW fell sharply. That operational progress was supported by a capital program almost twice Manila Water’s reported first-half capex.

The rivalry can therefore be summarized in two lines:

MWC is raising revenue primarily through price while investing strategically in a new raw-water platform.

MYNLD is raising revenue primarily through volume while spending aggressively to repair and expand its existing network.

For the moment, Manila Water has the stronger income statement and better cash generation after current capex. Maynilad has the larger organic investment runway and stronger liquidity position. The ultimate winner will be determined by whether Manila Water can earn enough from its leveraged Wawa investment—and whether Maynilad can turn today’s heavy construction spending into sustained billed-volume growth and future tariff recovery.

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs. 

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