Buying First Gen could give Prime Infrastructure a listed vehicle, end a damaging control dispute, and provide the Lopez group with enough capital to repair its empire—including ABS-CBN.
Sometimes the price of corporate peace is best expressed per share.
For the Lopez family, that figure may be ₱81. At that price, First Gen Corporation would carry an equity value of approximately ₱291 billion, or about US$4.75 billion. That would represent a formidable premium over FGEN’s recent market price near ₱20, but it would also recognize the hidden value of its interest in Energy Development Corporation, its remaining gas exposure, hydroelectric assets, pumped-storage investments, and an unusually liquid parent balance sheet. FGEN has approximately 3.597 billion common shares outstanding, making the arithmetic straightforward.
The most plausible buyer need not be found abroad. Enrique Razon Jr.’s Prime Infrastructure Capital Inc. is already doing business with FGEN on both sides of the negotiating table. Prime Infra acquired 60% of First Gen’s gas business for about ₱50 billion in 2025. First Gen has since invested in Prime Infra’s pumped-storage hydro platform, deepening a partnership that now spans gas generation, LNG-related infrastructure and energy storage. Prime Infra has also expanded overseas through its proposed acquisition of Colombia’s SierraCol Energy and has secured large financing packages for the development of Philippine hydropower projects.
A takeover of FGEN would therefore not be an introduction. It would be the logical culmination of an increasingly intimate industrial alliance.
The cheque would be large—but not implausible
At ₱81 a share, purchasing 100% of FGEN would cost approximately:
At roughly ₱61.3 per dollar, that is approximately US$4.75 billion.
But Prime Infra would not necessarily need to buy every share at once. First Philippine Holdings Corporation owns approximately 67.84% of FGEN, while KKR’s investment vehicles collectively hold about 19.9%. Acquiring only FPH’s controlling block at ₱81 per share would initially cost approximately:
or roughly US$3.2 billion, before any mandatory tender offer and related transaction expenses. A complete acquisition would require equitable treatment of KKR, retail shareholders, and the rest of the public float. KKR accumulated its FGEN stake through tender offers in 2020 and 2021, paying ₱22.50 and ₱33 per share, respectively.
Razon’s expanding fortune makes the proposal financially conceivable, though hardly effortless. ICTSI’s market value has surged, and Razon’s attributable interest in the port operator was reported at 61.87% as of June 30, 2026. Forbes’ real-time estimate recently placed Razon’s net worth above US$20 billion, substantially higher than the US$16.5 billion attached to his name in the March 2026 annual ranking. Most of that wealth is not cash, but a rising listed equity base gives Razon access to financing, collateral and institutional partners on a scale few Philippine investors can match.
Prime Infra itself is no longer a speculative collection of development projects. It reported approximately US$1.18 billion in revenue in 2025, US$231.7 million in profit, and US$8.38 billion in assets, according to its entry in the Fortune Southeast Asia 500. Its portfolio now spans water, gas, power generation, waste management, pumped storage, and overseas upstream energy.
Funding a US$4.75 billion acquisition would nonetheless require more than a wealthy sponsor. Prime Infra would probably need a combination of acquisition debt, co-investment capital, asset-level refinancing and perhaps an equity injection involving ICTSI-related or international infrastructure investors. The financing must also account for FGEN’s consolidated borrowings and enormous capital commitments. The headline purchase price would be the beginning of the funding exercise, not the end.
A listed shell with real assets
The strategic prize would extend beyond FGEN’s power portfolio. Prime Infra remains privately held. By acquiring control of listed FGEN and subsequently injecting Prime Infra assets into it, Razon could potentially use FGEN as a backdoor listing vehicle for a broader infrastructure platform.
Such a restructuring could combine:
- Prime Infra’s controlling interest in the former First Gen gas portfolio;
- FGEN’s remaining 40% gas interest;
- Malampaya-related upstream exposure;
- Manila Water;
- pumped-storage hydro projects;
- solar, waste and other infrastructure businesses;
- FGEN’s hydroelectric and energy-solutions operations;
- potentially SierraCol or selected international assets.
The industrial simplification would be compelling. The gas assets that First Gen divided with Prime Infra could be reunited. Their overlapping pumped-storage interests could be consolidated. Public investors would gain access to a larger Razon-led infrastructure company, while Prime Infra would obtain FGEN’s PSE listing, governance architecture and institutional shareholder base. Prime Infra’s existing portfolio includes Manila Water, Prime Energy, Prime CoreGen, Ahunan Power, Olympia Violago Water and Power, Prime Solar and Prime Waste.
But “backdoor listing” should not be mistaken for a legal shortcut. Any asset injection large enough to transform FGEN could constitute a substantial acquisition or change in business. It would likely require independent valuation, board and shareholder approvals, related-party safeguards, PSE and SEC review, and potentially a follow-on offering to maintain an adequate public float. KKR’s position would also be critical: the investment firm could sell, remain as a cornerstone shareholder, or roll its interest into the enlarged Prime Infra–FGEN platform. KKR has previously described FGEN as a strategic Asian infrastructure investment and increased its stake to approximately 19.9% after its second tender offer.
For Razon, this may be preferable to waiting for Prime Infra's conventional initial public offering. A reorganized FGEN would already have listed shares, public reporting systems, and a recognizable energy franchise. For minority investors, however, the bargain would be acceptable only if valuations were independently established and the transaction did not merely transfer privately held assets into FGEN at an inflated price.
A price for ending the feud
The case for a sale becomes stronger when placed against the Lopez group’s governance crisis.
The family dispute has spilled into listed companies, delayed shareholder meetings and generated allegations concerning disclosure, control and change-of-management provisions in transactions between First Gen and Prime Infra. Federico “Piki” Lopez challenged his removal at Lopez Inc. and obtained judicial protection while the dispute proceeded. FPH subsequently deferred its annual shareholders’ meeting, an extraordinary public symptom of a private family disagreement.
A cash offer at ₱81 could give both sides an exit from a conflict in which the financial consequences increasingly fall on investors who are not members of the family. The Lopezes exercise ultimate control over FGEN through a corporate pyramid, but FPH owns only 67.84% directly, and KKR owns almost one-fifth. Retail investors, pension capital and other institutions supply the balance. The family’s effective economic interest becomes progressively thinner as one moves down from Lopez Inc. through Lopez Holdings, FPH, FGEN and EDC.
Selling FGEN would remove the largest operating asset from the battlefield. It would transform an argument over corporate control into a question of allocating cash—still difficult, but less destructive to a listed company and its minority shareholders.
The partnership between Razon and Piki Lopez could make such a settlement politically possible within the corporate sphere. Their companies have already completed transactions of considerable size, and their latest pumped-storage partnership suggests mutual confidence at the operating level. Piki could present a negotiated sale not as surrender, but as the culmination of a capital-recycling strategy: gas monetized first, FGEN sold at a premium next, and shareholder value crystallized in cash.
That narrative would be especially credible if KKR endorsed the price following an independent process. An ₱81 offer would be more than twice KKR’s 2021 tender-offer entry of ₱33 and substantially above FGEN’s recent market quotation. But KKR would examine not merely the premium but also whether the offer reflects EDC’s value and the full worth of FGEN’s residual gas, hydro, and storage assets.
The ABS-CBN temptation
A sale could also provide the Lopez group with something it has lacked since 2020: financial room to restructure its wider empire.
ABS-CBN ended 2025 with approximately ₱11.8 billion of borrowings. Its net loss narrowed to ₱4.72 billion from ₱6.09 billion, but revenue declined to ₱15.85 billion, and debt reduction continued to rely on asset sales. The company sold much of its Quezon City property and used the proceeds to repay loans and support liquidity.
The family dispute has reportedly included disagreement over whether resources connected to the energy group should support ABS-CBN. Piki’s side has questioned committing additional funds, while other family members have sought greater support for the media company. Those claims remain contested, but the dispute illustrates why public-company money should not be treated casually as family money. FGEN belongs not only to the Lopezes but also to KKR and thousands of minority shareholders.
A properly structured FGEN sale would change that distinction. Once proceeds reached FPH, Lopez Holdings and eventually Lopez Inc. through lawful dividends, tender offers or capital reductions, the family could deploy its own realized funds to repair ABS-CBN without compelling FGEN’s minority investors to subsidize a separate media business.
The amounts involved would dwarf ABS-CBN’s current debt. FPH’s gross proceeds from selling its 67.84% FGEN block at ₱81 would approach ₱198 billion. Even after taxes, obligations, holding-company debt, and distributions to Lopez Holdings’ own public shareholders, a relatively modest portion could refinance ABS-CBN’s ₱11.8 billion borrowings, fund restructuring, and provide a runway for its transition into a content, digital, and live-entertainment company.
That money should not simply cover continuing operating losses. A credible rescue would require debt restructuring, tighter cost controls, limits on related-party transfers, a sustainable content strategy, and possibly a strategic investor. Capital can buy time; it cannot recreate a broadcast franchise or guarantee profitable digital distribution.
Razon’s opportunity—and obligation
For Razon, buying FGEN would be an audacious attempt to do in energy what ICTSI accomplished in ports: build a Philippine-controlled infrastructure platform with global scale. Prime Infra already owns businesses across the energy value chain and is moving abroad. FGEN would provide listed currency, institutional shareholders, and a well-developed operating platform.
For the Lopezes, ₱81 a share could convert a contested pyramid of control into liquid wealth large enough to recapitalize the family’s remaining businesses, settle internal claims, and provide ABS-CBN with a viable—not sentimental—restructuring.
The attractive symmetry should not obscure the risks. Razon would be leveraging into a capital-intensive platform. Prime Infra’s private assets would require rigorous external valuation before any injection into FGEN. Minority shareholders would need a genuine exit at the same price paid to the controlling block. KKR would need fair treatment. Regulators would need to assess competition, energy concentration and the proposed listing structure.
Yet the alternative is hardly costless. The Lopez dispute is already distracting boards and delaying shareholder business. FGEN’s market price continues to reflect uncertainty over EDC, capital allocation and family control. ABS-CBN continues to burn through a shrinking asset base.
A hypothetical US$4.75 billion offer for all of FGEN—approximately ₱81 per share—could solve several problems at once. It could give Prime Infra a listed growth platform, give Razon control of a coherent energy portfolio, give FGEN minorities an exit at a substantial premium, and give the Lopez family the means to restructure its empire.
Most importantly, it could end a feud before the family’s struggle for control destroys more value than control is worth.
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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.
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