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VMC’s bitter sugar, sweet energy

 


Victorias Milling’s old sugar business is losing money. Its newer energy operations are keeping the group—and its dividend—sweet

For a company built on sugar, Victorias Milling Company is making surprisingly little money from it. In the nine months to May 31st 2026, the Philippine miller’s sugar operations generated ₱5.5bn ($96m) in revenue—and lost ₱312m. A year earlier, the same division had earned ₱196m. The swing of more than half a billion pesos would have left a less diversified firm nursing a consolidated loss. Victorias, however, reported net income of ₱1.12bn. The explanation lies not in the cane fields, but in its distillery and power plants.

The contrast between the company’s two main businesses is stark. Revenue from sugar milling and refining fell by 29%, from ₱7.79bn to ₱5.53bn. Renewable-energy revenue, meanwhile, rose by 33%, from ₱3.05bn to ₱4.05bn. Energy operations produced net income of nearly ₱1.5bn—more than the entire group earned after absorbing losses from sugar and its smaller businesses. What was once a useful diversification has become the company’s economic center of gravity. 

A bitter harvest

Victorias’s sugar division has been squeezed by two familiar agricultural afflictions: lower output and weaker prices. Raw-sugar sales fell by 38% to ₱2.96bn. Milling-service income, which depends on the quantity of cane delivered and processed, tumbled by 63% to ₱672m. Management blamed lower sugar production and softer domestic prices during the crop year. 

Refined sugar offered some relief. Sales nearly doubled, from ₱870m to ₱1.64bn. But the increase was not enough to compensate for the collapse in raw-sugar and milling income. Nor did it prevent the segment from slipping deeply into the red. The business’s problem was therefore not merely a change in product mix: the economics of turning cane into cash deteriorated sharply.

Sugar milling is structurally awkward. Mills require expensive machinery and large workforces, yet operate around a crop season over which they have limited control. Their efficiency depends on cane supply; their revenue depends on commodity prices; and their assets cannot easily be redeployed when either disappoints. Victorias operates a raw-sugar mill with daily capacity of 15,000 tonnes and a refinery capable of handling 25,000 Lkg a day. Such scale is advantageous when volumes are high. When the cane is scarce, fixed costs become a burden. 

The balance sheet displays the residue of the disappointing season. Inventories more than doubled, from ₱1.38bn in August 2025 to ₱2.96bn in May 2026. They included ₱1.69bn of refined sugar and ₱725m of molasses. Management describes the increase as the normal seasonal accumulation after milling. That may be so, but inventory is profit only in waiting. If prices strengthen and the stock is sold promptly, it will release cash and support future earnings. If prices remain soft, storage costs rise, cash stays trapped and write-downs become more likely. 

For now, the accounting has been benign. Victoria's recognized a modest ₱2.2m inventory provision over the nine-month period and reversed ₱114m of previous write-downs during the latest quarter. That reversal helped the company report almost unchanged quarterly gross profit despite a 26% contraction in revenue. It is a welcome benefit, though not one investors should automatically expect to recur. 

Energy in the tank

The renewable-energy division operates rather differently. It includes a distillery producing alcohol and ethanol from molasses, much of it supplied by the company’s own sugar operations, and a power business that exports electricity generated from renewable sources. The distillery has a daily capacity of 180,000 liters; the group’s registered power-plant capacity is 93MW. This arrangement turns what was once a low-value by-product of sugar production into fuel and electricity. 

Ethanol is doing most of the heavy lifting. Its sales rose by 48%, from ₱2.28bn to ₱3.37bn. Power sales, by contrast, declined by 11% to ₱653m. Yet the energy segment as a whole produced ₱1.50bn in profit on ₱4.05bn of revenue, implying a net margin of roughly 37%. A business representing about two-fifths of segment revenue generated more than all of the group’s earnings. 

This is vertical integration at its most useful. Molasses, a by-product of extracting sugar from cane, becomes an input for ethanol. Bagasse and other biomass can support power generation. The same crop thus creates several revenue streams: sugar, milling fees, alcohol, fuel and electricity. In a difficult sugar market, the downstream products provide a hedge.

But the hedge is not perfect. The energy division’s success has changed the nature of the group’s risk rather than abolished it. Victorias is now less dependent on sugar prices for its profits, but more exposed to ethanol demand, selling prices, regulation and the cost and availability of molasses. A prolonged shortage of cane could eventually affect both the old business and the supposedly diversifying one. If the distillery must buy more feedstock from outside mills, its enviable margins may narrow.

Less revenue, better economics

At the consolidated level, Victorias’s results are stronger than the topline decline suggests. Revenue fell by 11% to ₱9.69bn, but cost of sales and services declined by 13%. Gross profit consequently slipped by only 3%, to ₱1.54bn, and gross margin improved from 14.6% to 15.9%. Net margin remained close to 11.5% despite the sugar division’s losses. 

The latest quarter was more striking. Revenue fell by 26% year on year to ₱3.08bn, yet net profit increased by 13% to ₱444m. Quarterly gross margin rose from 13.7% to 18.5%, and net margin from 9.4% to 14.4%. Some of that improvement came from the inventory-provision reversal and a foreign-exchange gain. Even so, the figures demonstrate a substantial change in the quality of Victorias’s revenue: the company sold less, but earned more from each peso of sales. 

Cash flow provides a more cautious reading. Cash generated from operations improved markedly, from ₱84m to ₱558m. Yet inventories absorbed ₱1.57bn and receivables another ₱205m. Capital expenditure of ₱738m exceeded operating cash generation, leaving an approximate shortfall of ₱180m before dividends and other financing payments. Cash and short-term investments declined from ₱2.54bn to ₱2.16bn.

There is little immediate cause for alarm. Victorias has no conventional bank loans, and equity of ₱14.24bn finances about 85% of its assets. Its regular dividend of ₱0.05 a share amounts to roughly a quarter of parent-attributable nine-month earnings. The balance sheet can withstand a disappointing crop better than it could during the financial troubles that placed the company under rehabilitation decades ago. Victorias nevertheless remains formally under rehabilitation, and still carries ₱424m of provisions for legal claims. 

The strategic question is whether sugar’s weakness is cyclical or chronic. A recovery in cane volumes and prices could make Victorias a formidable combination: a profitable mill feeding a high-margin ethanol and power operation. But if sugar continues to lose money, the old business may come to resemble an expensive supplier to the new one.

For the moment, the company’s smokestacks are doing what its cane fields cannot. Sugar still gives Victorias its name, its assets and much of its revenue. Renewable energy gives it its profit.

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs. 

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