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Security Bank’s Q1 2026 Results: NIM Expansion, Provision Drag and Mark-to-Market Pain

 

Security Bank widened its net interest margin and lifted core spread income in the first quarter, but higher credit-loss provisions, trading and foreign-exchange losses, and unrealized FVOCI mark-to-market losses kept the results from becoming a clean earnings-growth story.

For a bank, a wider net interest margin is usually the closest thing to good weather. Loans and securities earn more than deposits and borrowings cost; the balance sheet breathes easier; profits should follow. In the first quarter of 2026, Security Bank Corporation seemed to enjoy just such a climate. Its net interest margin widened to 5.36%, from 4.51% a year earlier, while net interest income jumped 27.6% to ₱15.16bn. Interest income rose to ₱19.92bn, but the larger story was on the funding side: interest expense fell to ₱4.76bn from ₱6.76bn.

Yet the weather did not hold. The bank’s bottom line slipped. Net income fell to ₱2.70bn, down from ₱2.82bn a year earlier; earnings per share declined to ₱3.58 from ₱3.74. The paradox of the quarter is therefore simple: SECB’s engine ran faster, but the road grew rougher. A healthy expansion in spreads was absorbed by heavier loss provisioning, trading losses, and foreign-exchange losses.

The first absorber was the cost of credit. Provision for credit losses rose to ₱3.88bn, from ₱2.38bn in the same period last year — an increase of around ₱1.50bn, or 63%. That alone consumed almost half of the ₱3.28bn year-on-year improvement in net interest income. Management described the increase as part of a prudent risk-management approach amid evolving operating conditions. In plainer language: the bank earned more from its balance sheet, but set aside much more for loans that may sour.

The second absorber was the market book. Trading and securities results swung to a ₱712.5m loss, from a ₱165.8m gain a year earlier. Foreign exchange also turned sharply negative, with a ₱977.5m loss, compared with a ₱145.8m gain in Q1 2025. Together, these two items turned what could have been a clean margin-expansion story into something messier. SECB’s operating income still rose to ₱17.03bn, from ₱15.41bn, but non-interest income weakened materially as market movements cut into earnings.

The result was a quarter of improved core profitability but weaker reported profitability. Return on average assets fell to 0.90%, from 1.01%. Return on average equity declined to 7.03%, from 7.92%. Cost discipline improved: the cost-to-income ratio improved to 55.89% from 60.59%. But a lower cost ratio cannot fully impress when the conversion of revenue into profit is being interrupted by credit charges and market losses. 

There was another blow below the net-income line. Comprehensive income turned negative, not because the bank lost money in the ordinary sense, but because its securities book suffered mark-to-market damage. SECB reported other comprehensive loss of ₱3.45bn, driven mainly by a ₱4.55bn net unrealized loss on debt instruments at fair value through other comprehensive income. As a result, total comprehensive income swung to a ₱743.9m loss, compared with a ₱3.83bn gain a year earlier. This is the accounting reality of a large bond portfolio in a volatile rates environment: even profitable banks can report negative comprehensive income when fair values move against them.

The balance sheet, meanwhile, became more liquid but less loan-driven. Total assets increased to ₱1.22trn, from ₱1.19trn at end-2025. But net loans declined to ₱679.44bn, from ₱696.64bn, as lower commercial and retail balances offset growth in MSME lending. Deposits rose modestly to ₱937.98bn, helped by higher demand and savings deposits, while time deposits declined. This combination pushed the net loans-to-deposits ratio down to 72.44%, from 74.87%, reinforcing the impression of a bank with ample liquidity but softer loan deployment. 

Asset quality showed mild strain. SECB’s net NPL ratio rose to 1.40%, from 1.31% at the end of 2025, while NPL cover declined to 80.66%, from 85.61%. These are not alarming figures, but they help explain the more conservative provisioning stance. The allowance for credit losses stood at ₱18.85bn against gross loans and receivables of ₱698.29bn

Capital and liquidity remain the safer parts of the story. The bank’s capital adequacy ratio stood at 13.09%, above the BSP’s minimum requirement of 10%, while Tier 1 CAR was 12.24%. Liquidity was also comfortable: the liquidity coverage ratio was 197.83%, and the net stable funding ratio was 145.11%, both well above the 100% regulatory threshold. In other words, SECB does not look stretched. It looks profitable, liquid, and adequately capitalized — but not yet firing cleanly. 

For investors, Q1 2026 offers a useful distinction between margin expansion and earnings expansion. SECB achieved the former. It did not achieve the latter. A bank can widen NIM by repricing assets, lowering funding costs, or changing its mix. But shareholders ultimately need those gains to survive the journey through provisions, trading volatility, taxes, and capital-market marks. In SECB’s case, much of the spread windfall was intercepted before reaching the bottom line.

The quarter’s message is therefore not bearish, but conditional. If NIM remains above 5%, if loan growth resumes, and if provisions normalize, earnings could improve meaningfully. But if credit costs stay elevated and the securities book remains vulnerable to mark-to-market losses, SECB’s reported profitability may remain choppy. The bank has a stronger spread machine. What it needs now is a smoother road. 

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs. 

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