Skip to main content

RCBC vs UBP Q1 2026: Rising Rates Boost Margins but Expose Bond Losses

RCBC vs UBP Q1 2026 Results: How Rising Interest Rates Hit Yuchengco and Aboitiz Banks Differently

In banking, interest rates are not simply a blessing or a curse. They come as a bargain. Wider margins can fatten the income statement, while the same market forces can bruise the balance sheet through bond losses that sit quietly in other comprehensive income. In the first quarter of 2026, that bargain looked much kinder to Aboitiz-backed Union Bank of the Philippines than to Yuchengco-led Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. UBP reported ₱3.83 billion in net income, up 167 percent from a year earlier, while RCBC posted ₱2.7 billion, up 11.6 percent

The contrast was not that RCBC failed to benefit from the rate environment. It did. The bank’s net interest income rose 25 percent to ₱15.4 billion, a strong performance driven by better yields and a sharp decline in interest expense. Its net interest margin improved to 5.2 percent, from 4.8 percent at year-end 2025. But the improvement came with a visible shadow: RCBC’s capital funds fell partly because of a ₱2.54 billion lower valuation of FVOCI investments, a mark-to-market drag nearly as large as the quarter’s reported profit.

UBP’s quarter had its own blemishes, but they were easier to absorb. Its net interest margin reached 6.7 percent, compared with 6.3 percent a year earlier, as interest expense declined to ₱4.45 billion from ₱5.40 billion. Net interest income rose to ₱16.76 billion, and provisions for credit losses fell 18 percent, giving the bank a cleaner path from revenue to earnings. UBP also recorded mark-to-market pressure, including ₱1.28 billion in unrealized FVOCI losses, but the hit was smaller relative to its balance sheet and capital base. 

That is the essential difference between the two banks. UBP was the cleaner beneficiary of the rate environment: wider spreads, lower funding costs, stronger earnings, and relatively contained FVOCI damage. RCBC was more exposed on the OCI and capital side: its core lending engine improved, but its much larger FVOCI portfolio made rising yields more painful for equity. RCBC’s FVOCI assets stood at ₱140.2 billion, compared with UBP’s ₱41.6 billion

The bond-book gap matters. RCBC’s FVOCI portfolio was equivalent to roughly 94 percent of its capital funds, while UBP’s was only about 21 percent of its capital. That means the same move in market yields can leave a much larger mark on RCBC’s book value. RCBC’s capital adequacy ratio fell to 13.2 percent from 14.5 percent, while its CET1 ratio dropped to 12.3 percent from 13.6 percent. UBP’s capital ratios also declined, but from a stronger position: CAR stood at 14.6 percent, and CET1 at 13.8 percent.

RCBC’s quarter was therefore a story of strength diluted by sensitivity. Its traditional banking franchise continued to expand: deposits rose to ₱1.06 trillion, while net loans and receivables reached ₱811.0 billion. Its cost-to-income ratio of 54.3 percent was also better than UBP’s 57.4 percent, suggesting a leaner operating profile. But higher impairment provisions, which jumped 62 percent to ₱4.7 billion, largely offset the benefit from stronger spread income. 

UBP, by contrast, looked like a bank whose earlier pressure points were finally easing. Its total resources rose to ₱1.18 trillion, net loans increased to ₱553.6 billion, and deposits reached ₱751.7 billion. The bank’s performance was supported not only by margin expansion but also by lower credit costs and other income, including foreign-exchange-related gains, even as trading and investment securities resulted in a ₱136 million loss.

Still, UBP’s advantage was not costless. Its deposit mix weakened as its CASA ratio fell to 65.1 percent from 68.1 percent at year-end 2025, with time deposits growing faster than cheaper demand and savings deposits. That raises a question for the rest of the year: whether lower funding costs can persist if customers continue migrating toward higher-yielding deposits.

For investors, the comparison is less about which bank “won” the quarter and more about the character of each bank’s exposure. UBP showed better earnings conversion: higher NIM, stronger ROA, stronger capital, and sharply faster profit growth. RCBC showed balance-sheet scale and operating efficiency, but its much larger FVOCI book made capital more vulnerable to market-rate movements. 

The first quarter, then, offered a study in rate-cycle asymmetry. Both banks enjoyed the income benefit of repricing. But only one emerged with the cleaner trade. For UBP, the rate environment widened the spread and left manageable scars. For RCBC, it widened the spread, too — but the bond book bled through equity.

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us!

Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs. 

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

The Ayalas didn’t “lose” Alabang Town Center—They cashed out like disciplined capital allocators

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! If you only read the headline—Ayala Land exits Alabang Town Center (ATC)—you might mistake it for a retreat, or worse, a concession to the Madrigal–Bayot clan. But the paper trail tells a more nuanced story: the Ayalas weren’t unwilling to buy out the Madrigals; they simply didn’t need to—and didn’t want to at that price, at that point in the cycle. And that’s exactly where the contrast with the Lopezes begins. In late December 2025, Lopez-controlled Rockwell Land stepped in to buy a controlling 74.8% stake in the ATC-owning company for ₱21.6 billion—explicitly pitching long-term redevelopment upside as the prize. A week earlier, Ayala Land (ALI) signed an agreement to sell its 50% stake for ₱13.5 billion after an unsolicited premium offer —and said it would redeploy proceeds into its leasing growth pipeline and return of capital to stakeholders. Same asset. Two mindsets. 1) Why buy what you already co...

From Meralco to Rockwell: How the Lopezes Restructured to Put Rockwell Land Under FPH’s Control

  The Big Picture In the span of just a few years, the Lopez family executed a complex corporate restructuring that shifted Rockwell Land Corporation firmly under First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPH) —even as they parted with “precious” equity in Manila Electric Company (Meralco) to make it happen. The strategy wove together property dividends, special block sales, and the monetization of legacy assets, ultimately consolidating one of the Philippines’ most admired property brands inside the Lopezes’ flagship holding company.  Laying the Groundwork (1996–2009) Rockwell began as First Philippine Realty and Development Corporation and was rebranded Rockwell Land in 1995. A pivotal capital infusion in September 1996 brought in three major shareholders— Meralco , FPH , and Benpres (now Lopez Holdings) —setting up a tripartite structure that would endure for more than a decade.  By August 2009 , the Lopezes made a decisive move: Benpres sold its 24.5% Rockwell stake...

Lopez, Gokongwei, Gatchalian, Romualdez: The PCIBank Boardroom Drama

  By early 1999, PCIBank had become more than one of the Philippines’ largest lenders; it had become a test of whether a major bank could remain stable when its ownership rested on a fragile balance between two business clans. Publicly accessible historical sources identify Eugenio Lopez Jr. as chairman and John Gokongwei Jr. as vice-chairman of PCIBank before the sale to Equitable, showing that the institution was effectively run through a dual-center power structure at the top.  What happened beneath that formal structure is harder to document with certainty. It was allegedly governed by a shareholder arrangement between the Lopez and Gokongwei groups that allowed the two camps to share control of PCIBank, with Mr Lopez as chairman and Mr Gokongwei, though vice-chairman, allegedly exercising influence through the bank’s executive committee. We have not found the actual shareholder agreement in the public sources reviewed here, so that part of the story should be trea...