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GCash’s Parent Is Making Banks Look Less Profitable

Mynt, the company behind GCash, is showing the power of platform finance: fewer branches, more transactions, and far better profit conversion than two established banks. In 1Q26, it generated more revenue, more than twice the profit, and a much fatter margin than RCBC and Security Bank. 

A curious thing happened in Philippine finance in the first quarter of 2026. Two established universal banks, RCBC and Security Bank, each generated roughly ₱17bn in operating income and about ₱2.7bn in net income. Mynt, the parent company of GCash, reported higher revenue of ₱20.9bn and net income of ₱5.6bn. 

The comparison is not perfect. Banks and fintech platforms do different things. RCBC and Security Bank take deposits, make loans, manage capital, absorb credit losses, and operate within a dense regulatory framework. Mynt sits at the heart of the daily financial habits of millions of mobile users. Yet the contrast is revealing. In 1Q26, Mynt was not merely bigger than these two banks by revenue; it was far more profitable.

RCBC reported ₱15.4bn in net interest income, which represented 90.4% of total operating income, implying total operating income of around ₱17.0bn. Its net income was ₱2.7bn. Security Bank reported ₱15.161bn in net interest income, ₱17.028bn in total operating income, and ₱2.704bn in net income. Mynt, meanwhile, generated ₱20.9bn in revenue and ₱5.6bn in net income. 

The margin arithmetic is stark. RCBC converted about 15.9% of its operating income into net income. Security Bank did almost exactly the same, also at about 15.9%. Mynt converted about 26.8% of revenue into net income. In other words, Mynt’s net margin was roughly 11 percentage points higher than either bank’s. 

That is the heart of the story. Mynt did not simply earn more because it had more revenue. It earned more because each peso of revenue appeared to travel more efficiently to the bottom line.

Part of the explanation lies in the drag that comes with banking. RCBC booked ₱4.7bn in impairment loss provisions, equivalent to 27.6% of total operating income. Security Bank recorded ₱3.880bn in provisions for credit losses. These are not incidental items. They are the cost of being a lender in a world of imperfect borrowers, shifting rates, and uncertain economic conditions. 

Mynt also has credit exposure through its lending arm and should not be mistaken for a riskless toll road. But its business model is broader than lending. GCash begins with payments, transfers, bills, merchant transactions, and wallet activity. From there, Mynt layers on credit, savings, investments, insurance, and other app-based financial services. Globe’s reporting describes Mynt as the company behind GCash and highlights its growing contribution to Globe’s results. 

That difference matters. RCBC and Security Bank are financial intermediaries. Their earnings depend heavily on spreads, asset quality, capital, provisions, and operating leverage. Mynt is becoming something else: a financial operating system. Its advantage is not a bigger balance sheet but a more frequent customer relationship. A bank customer may visit a branch rarely and open a banking app occasionally. A GCash user may transact repeatedly throughout the week. 

Frequency is valuable because it creates data, habit, and distribution. Payments may be thin-margin, but they are high-traffic. Once the user is inside the app, Mynt can cross-sell lending, insurance, investment, and merchant services at low incremental distribution cost. Traditional banks can cross-sell too, but often through heavier infrastructure: branches, relationship managers, compliance layers, credit teams, and legacy systems. 

Security Bank’s own numbers show the burden of the traditional model. Its 1Q26 income statement shows ₱17.028bn in total operating income, but ₱13.397bn in total operating expenses after provisions, leaving ₱3.630bn in income before tax and ₱2.704bn in net income. RCBC’s story is similar: strong net interest income, but heavy provisions and operating costs reduced final profit to ₱2.7bn

Mynt’s model looks more scalable. Its ₱20.9bn in revenue translated into ₱5.6bn in net income, which means it earned a little more than twice RCBC’s and Security Bank’s quarterly profits. Against RCBC’s ₱2.7bn, Mynt earned about 107% more. Against Security Bank’s ₱2.704bn, Mynt also earned about 107% more

This does not mean Mynt is a better bank than the banks. It is not a bank in the same sense. RCBC and Security Bank carry regulated banking franchises, deposit bases, loan books, and capital buffers. RCBC’s financial performance table shows a 5.2% net interest margin, 7.2% return on average equity, and 0.8% return on average assets. Security Bank reported a net interest margin of 5.36%, a return on average equity of 7.03%, and a return on average assets of 0.90%. These are banking metrics that measure a business built around balance-sheet risk. 

Mynt should be judged differently. Its profitability comes from platform economics: huge user reach, merchant acceptance, data-driven product distribution, and low marginal cost of serving additional transactions. Its challenge will be to prove that high profitability can withstand tougher credit cycles, rising competition, regulatory scrutiny, and the operational risks that accompany becoming a national financial utility. 

Still, the 1Q26 comparison is striking. RCBC and Security Bank looked like solid banks grinding through the ordinary economics of lending. Mynt looked like a digital platform converting financial traffic into profit at a much higher rate. That is why investors are increasingly treating GCash not as a useful app attached to Globe, but as one of the most important financial businesses in the country. 

The lesson is simple. The old banking model earns from balance sheets. The new platform model earns from behavior. In the first quarter of 2026, behavior won.

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs. 

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