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Razon’s Bloomberry Posts Loss After VIP, Mass Gaming Weakness

 

VIP weakness and softer mass play dragged first-quarter gaming revenue lower, while margin compression pushed the casino operator into a quarterly loss

Bloomberry Resorts Corp. opened 2026 with a reminder that even a larger casino footprint does not fully shield an operator from a downturn in gaming demand.

The Enrique Razon-led casino operator reported a 12.6% year-on-year decline in consolidated gross gaming revenue to ₱14.67 billion in the first quarter, as VIP and mass-market activity weakened across its Philippine gaming floors. Philippine VIP rolling chip volume fell 39.7%, mass table drop declined 9.9%, and slot coin-in slipped 9.6%, underscoring a broad slowdown in casino play rather than a single-segment softness. 

The decline pushed Bloomberry into a materially weaker earnings position. Consolidated EBITDA dropped 32.0% to ₱2.98 billion, while EBITDA margin narrowed to 22.7% from 30.5% a year earlier. Net income swung to a ₱125.0 million loss, compared with ₱3.31 billion profit in the same period last year. 

The result marks a difficult quarter for Bloomberry as its flagship Solaire Resort Entertainment City faced weaker gaming volumes, while the newer Solaire Resort North continued to ramp up but was not yet large enough to offset the pressure at the mature Parañaque property.


Gaming Weakness Cuts Across VIP, Mass and Slots

The most visible pressure came from gaming.

Bloomberry’s Philippine operations generated ₱14.67 billion in gross gaming revenue, down from ₱16.78 billion a year earlier. VIP table revenue fell to ₱2.06 billion from ₱3.27 billion, mass table revenue declined to ₱5.88 billion from ₱6.88 billion, while slot revenue rose slightly to ₱6.73 billion from ₱6.63 billion despite lower coin-in, helped by a stronger hold rate. 

At Solaire Entertainment City, the weakness was sharper. Gross gaming revenue fell 17.9% to ₱9.98 billion, as VIP rolling chip volume declined 39.4%, mass table drop fell 7.5%, and slot coin-in dropped 21.5%. VIP revenue declined 29.1%, mass table revenue fell 20.6%, and slot revenue slipped 7.7%

That mattered because Entertainment City remains Bloomberry’s core earnings engine. Its EBITDA declined to ₱1.93 billion from ₱3.44 billion, a 43.9% year-on-year drop, as lower net revenue and digital gaming-related costs weighed on profitability.

Solaire North offered a partial offset. The Quezon City resort posted ₱4.70 billion in gross gaming revenue, up 1.3% from the prior year. Slot revenue rose 20.2% to ₱2.64 billion, supported by an 18.6% increase in slot coin-in, but VIP revenue fell sharply as rolling chip volume declined and hold normalized from a high base. 


Margins Compress as Costs Stay Sticky

Bloomberry’s top line was not weak across the board. Hotel, food, and beverage revenue rose 25.2% to ₱1.93 billion, helped by stronger hotel occupancy and higher food and beverage covers at both Solaire Entertainment City and Solaire North. 

But the improvement in non-gaming revenue was not enough to offset the decline in gaming revenue.

Net revenues fell 8.8% to ₱13.10 billion, while cash operating expenses rose 1.4% to ₱10.12 billion. Management said operating expenses associated with MegaFUNalo!, the company’s online gaming platform, amounted to ₱229.5 million in the first quarter. 

That combination — lower gaming revenue and sticky costs — drove the EBITDA margin down to 22.7%, from 30.5% a year earlier. On a hold-normalized basis, EBITDA fell 34.3% to ₱2.69 billion, suggesting that the deterioration was not merely a function of gaming luck. 

The company’s reported VIP hold rate was 3.54%, above the normalized rate of 2.85%, which means headline EBITDA was actually supported by favorable VIP hold. Without that hold benefit, underlying profitability would have been weaker. 


Bottom Line Turns Negative Despite Some Offsets

The swing to a net loss was particularly notable because Bloomberry had several cushions during the quarter.

Interest expense declined 16.8% to ₱1.78 billion, reflecting lower financing costs versus the prior year. The group also booked a ₱162.3 million foreign exchange gain, compared with a ₱85.9 million foreign exchange loss in the first quarter of 2025. In addition, Jeju Sun recognized ₱403.0 million from the sale of its casino license.

Even with those supports, Bloomberry posted a net loss of ₱124.98 million, compared with net income of ₱3.31 billion a year earlier. Basic and diluted loss per share stood at ₱0.012, versus basic earnings per share of ₱0.315 and diluted earnings per share of ₱0.313 in the comparable period. 

The result indicates that the core operating decline was significant enough to overwhelm lower interest expense and non-operating gains.


Liquidity Holds, But Debt-Funded Cash Increase Raises Caution

Bloomberry’s balance sheet remained manageable, though leverage stayed elevated.

Cash and cash equivalents increased 19.1% to ₱31.56 billion from ₱26.51 billion at the end of 2025. However, the increase was mainly due to the availment of a ₱5.5 billion short-term loan, which also raised current liabilities.

Current liabilities rose 31.2% to ₱21.51 billion, while current assets increased 16.5% to ₱35.74 billion. As a result, the current ratio weakened to 1.66x from 1.87x at year-end.

Total liabilities rose to ₱134.80 billion, while equity slipped to ₱59.24 billion due to the quarter’s loss. Bloomberry’s debt-equity ratio stood at 2.28x, while net debt-equity was 1.74x. Management said BRHI and Sureste remained compliant with debt covenants as of March 31, 2026. 


Cash Flow Remains Positive, But Cushion Narrows

Operating cash flow remained positive at ₱2.21 billion, but fell from ₱3.51 billion a year earlier. The decline reflected weaker earnings before interest, depreciation, and amortization, as well as working capital movements, including higher receivables and lower payables.

Investing cash outflow amounted to ₱503.0 million, largely for property and equipment additions tied to ongoing renovation and improvement works. Financing cash flow turned positive at ₱3.23 billion, driven by the short-term loan, partly offset by ₱1.72 billion in interest payments and ₱539.7 million in long-term debt principal repayments


The Read-Through

Bloomberry’s first-quarter results were not a solvency event. The company remains cash-rich, covenant-compliant, and supported by two large Philippine integrated resorts.

But the quarter was a clear warning of declining profitability.

The key concern is that gaming weakness was broad: VIP rolling volume, mass table drop, and slot coin-in all declined. Solaire North is contributing, but the ramp-up is not yet enough to offset softness at Solaire Entertainment City. Meanwhile, digital gaming expenses and fixed operating costs are pressuring margins.

For investors, the next few quarters will likely hinge on three questions: whether Entertainment City gaming volumes recover, whether Solaire North can continue scaling EBITDA, and whether the company’s online gaming strategy becomes accretive rather than a drag.

Until then, Bloomberry’s Q1 numbers suggest a company with a still-solid asset base but a much thinner earnings cushion.

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.

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