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DigiPlus Bets Its Online Gaming Jackpot on a Losing Casino

 

As digital revenues slow and margins compress, the BingoPlus operator is using cash from its online gaming boom to buy into a loss-making Manila hotel-casino — while shareholders get a regular dividend, not a windfall payout.

DigiPlus Interactive Corp.’s online gaming boom has left it with one of the stronger balance sheets in Philippine gaming. But instead of handing shareholders a special windfall dividend, the company is deploying billions of pesos into a very different wager: a land-based casino operator that is still losing money, renovating heavily, and carrying the burden of a planned integrated-resort transformation. In March, DigiPlus booked a ₱5.9 billion cash outflow for convertible notes issued by Hong Kong-listed International Entertainment Corp., whose key asset is New Coast Hotel Manila, an integrated hotel and casino complex licensed by PAGCOR. 

The deal is framed by management as a strategic bridge between DigiPlus’ digital gaming empire — BingoPlus, ArenaPlus, and GameZone — and a physical entertainment platform. The notes form part of a HK$1.6 billion, roughly ₱12 billion, subscription agreement split into two HK$800 million tranches; if fully converted, DigiPlus is expected to hold about 53.89% of IEC. The notes carry 3% annual interest and are redeemable at 108% after five years if not converted. 

But the timing is awkward. DigiPlus’ own first-quarter results show the core online-led retail gaming engine losing momentum. Consolidated revenue fell 25% to ₱17.24 billion from ₱23.06 billion a year earlier, while retail games revenue — overwhelmingly the company’s main business — also declined 25% to ₱17.00 billion. DigiPlus attributed the fall primarily to the delinking of e-wallet in-app access to licensed online gaming platforms, which reduced user accessibility and transaction volumes, and to softer consumer spending, partly influenced by higher fuel costs. 

The pressure was sharper below the revenue line. Operating income dropped 49% to ₱2.17 billion, while EBITDA fell 42% to ₱2.64 billion. Costs declined only 20%, less than the 25% decline in revenue, revealing negative operating leverage just as DigiPlus is preparing to fund a capital-intensive offline expansion. Advertising and promotion expenses fell only 6% to ₱4.53 billion, meaning marketing consumed a larger share of sales even as revenue weakened. 

That makes the IEC investment a test of capital allocation. DigiPlus still had ₱20.50 billion in cash and cash equivalents at end-March, but that was down from ₱23.40 billion at end-2025, with the decline mainly due to investing cash outflows, especially the IEC convertible notes. Net cash used in investing activities reached ₱7.22 billion in the quarter, including the ₱5.90 billion investment in IEC notes.

For shareholders hoping the online gaming cash windfall would translate into a larger payout, the board offered continuity rather than largesse. DigiPlus declared a cash dividend of ₱0.83 per share in March 2026, payable April 15, slightly below the ₱0.86 per share declared in 2025. The company recognized ₱3.78 billion of cash dividends in the quarter, but there was no disclosed special or windfall dividend tied to the prior online gaming boom. 

Instead, the cash is being pointed toward an asset with turnaround characteristics. IEC, according to industry reports, saw its annual loss widen to about HK$282.1 million for the year ended June 30, 2025, from nearly HK$132.0 million a year earlier, even as revenue rose 146.4% to about HK$566.2 million. Gaming revenue surged, but higher staff costs, marketing expenses, depreciation, interest expense, and renovation-related write-offs pushed the group further into the red. 

IEC’s New Coast property is being redeveloped into a fuller integrated resort. Reports say IEC has pledged at least US$1 billion to transform the Manila hotel-casino, after taking over full operational control of the previously PAGCOR-run casino. Planned upgrades include more gaming tables, more slot machines, and an expanded room inventory, but the renovation has also temporarily reduced capacity and contributed to losses.

The first tranche of DigiPlus’ money has already strengthened IEC’s balance sheet. After issuing HK$800 million of subscription notes to DigiPlus, IEC said it repaid and redeemed HK$489 million in promissory notes and paid back HK$392 million in secured bank loans. That suggests DigiPlus is not merely buying optionality on a casino; it is helping refinance and stabilize a leveraged redevelopment vehicle.

For DigiPlus bulls, the logic is clear. The e-wallet disruption exposed the vulnerability of a business heavily dependent on digital access, payment rails and regulatory tolerance. A physical casino-hotel gives DigiPlus a second platform: a place for customer acquisition, loyalty programs, VIP play, events, brand activation, and potentially cross-selling between online and offline entertainment. DigiPlus itself said the IEC investment is intended to support strategic expansion and long-term value through participation in gaming and entertainment markets, while also complementing its digital operations with physical entertainment hubs and land-based gaming assets.

For skeptics, however, the deal raises a different question: why use cash generated by a high-margin online gaming boom to buy into a lower-margin, capex-heavy, loss-making casino turnaround just as the original cash machine is slowing? DigiPlus’ current ratio fell to 1.75x from 3.08x, liabilities rose 47% to ₱17.66 billion, and total equity declined slightly because dividends declared exceeded first-quarter earnings. Those metrics remain far from distressed, but they show the balance sheet becoming less conservative. 

There is also an earnings-quality wrinkle. DigiPlus reported ₱2.82 billion in net income for the quarter, down 33%, but that figure was supported by a ₱587.6 million fair-value gain on the IEC convertible notes and ₱205.1 million in foreign exchange gains. The operating business looked weaker: operating income was nearly cut in half. Because the notes are classified as financial assets at fair value through profit or loss, future changes in IEC valuation can move DigiPlus’ earnings up or down.

In other words, DigiPlus is swapping some of the simplicity of its online gaming growth story for a more complicated conglomerate-style narrative: digital platforms, overseas licenses, land-based gaming, hotel redevelopment, fair-value accounting, and possible control of a Hong Kong-listed casino operator. That may broaden the company’s moat if executed well. It may also dilute investor focus if IEC’s redevelopment consumes capital and management attention before contributing meaningful profit. 

The deal’s success will likely be judged over several quarters by two questions. First, can DigiPlus stabilize its core retail gaming revenue after the e-wallet disruption and rebuild margins without excessive promotional spending? Second, can IEC move from renovation-driven losses to profitable casino-hotel operations once New Coast’s upgraded gaming floor and hotel capacity come online? Until both are answered, DigiPlus shareholders are being asked to accept a regular dividend today in exchange for management’s larger bet on offline gaming tomorrow. 

Investor takeaway: DigiPlus is not short of cash — but it is choosing reinvestment over a windfall payout. That may be the right strategic call if IEC becomes a profitable land-based anchor for a broader entertainment ecosystem. But with retail gaming revenue down sharply, margins compressed, and IEC still loss-making, the acquisition shifts the story from “cash machine” to “execution risk.”

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.

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