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The trend in $WLCON’s 2025 results has changed the way the market values the company

 

WLCON still sells screws, tiles and taps. What it no longer sells, at least to the market, is the easy romance of premium growth. 

There is a brutal clarity to retail numbers when the music changes. Wilcon Depot’s 2025 results were not disastrous: net sales rose 3.7 per cent to ₱35.44bn, gross profit still increased to ₱13.68bn, and the company ended the year with 104 stores after adding new locations. Yet net income slipped 3.3 percent to ₱2.446bn, while same-store sales declined 0.3 percent for the full year and the core Depot format — which accounts for 96.3 percent of sales — managed only flat same-store growth. 

That combination matters more than the headline sales line. Investors will tolerate a modest decline in profit if they believe it is the temporary price of future scale. They are less forgiving when sales growth comes chiefly from opening more stores while the existing estate merely treads water. Wilcon’s own disclosures say full-year growth was driven mainly by expansion, while margins also softened: gross margin edged down to 38.6 percent from 39.1 percent, EBIT margin fell to 9.07 percent from 9.75 percent, and return on equity slipped to 9.86 percent from 10.61 percent.

The market’s response has been less a reprimand than a reclassification. At the end of 2024, historical data imply WLCON carried a market capitalization of roughly ₱58.63bn. By 31 December 2025, the annual report put market value at about ₱28.5bn based on a ₱6.96 closing price. By 1 April 2026, PSE stock data showed the shares at ₱6.35, implying a market capitalization of only ₱24.68bn

That is the real story. Earnings are down, yes — but only modestly. Valuation, by contrast, has been cut in half and then some. On a rough basis, the stock moved from around 23 times 2024 earnings at the end of 2024 to about 11.7 times 2025 earnings at the end of 2025, and to roughly 10 times trailing earnings by early April 2026. Sales multiples have compressed in tandem, from about 1.7 times revenue at end-2024 to about 0.8 times at end-2025 and closer to 0.7 times by April 2026. 

In plain English, the market is no longer valuing Wilcon as a premium growth retailer. It is valuing it as a mature retail chain that still has balance-sheet strength, still throws off cash, and still has room to open branches — but whose expansion no longer guarantees premium economics. That distinction is everything. A business can remain sound while its equity ceases to merit a heroic multiple. Wilcon’s results suggest precisely that. 

To see why, look at what is underneath the income statement. Operating expenses rose 3.5 to 3.7 percent in 2025, depending on the treatment of lease-related items, driven by higher depreciation, labor costs, and repairs and maintenance. Other income fell 12.3 percent, weighed down by weaker supplier support and fees. Project sales collapsed 46.8 percent to ₱185m. Even where the company is performing well — notably in Do-It-Wilcon, where sales rose 12.8 percent, and same-store sales grew 6.8 percent — the format is still only 3.2 percent of total sales, too small to move the whole ship just yet.

None of this means Wilcon is in trouble. On the contrary, its financial position remains one of the reasons the shares have not derated even further. The company ended 2025 with ₱2.571bn in cash and short-term investments, up 17.9 percent, while the current ratio improved to 2.88 times from 2.84 times. Management says the group remains bank debt-free, and recent market data show the stock trading at around 1.04 times book value. This is not the profile of a distressed retailer. It is the profile of one whose valuation floor is increasingly defined by assets, liquidity, and yield rather than by the market’s appetite for a growth narrative. 

There is, to be fair, a counterpoint. Wilcon finished 2025 more strongly than it started it. In the fourth quarter, net income jumped 41.3 percent to ₱580m, net sales rose 7.3 percent to ₱9.107bn, and same-store sales turned positive at 3.8 percent. Management attributed the improvement to changes in organizational structure, store layout, and product marketing. BusinessWorld and other local reports also noted a 26 percent rise in second-half net income. In other words, the worst may already be past.

But even that rebound says something subtle about valuation. The recovery has not restored the old multiple because investors no longer grant Wilcon the benefit of extrapolation. A one-quarter bounce may prove that the business is fixable; it does not yet prove that it deserves to be priced like a long-duration compounding machine. The market wants evidence that the Depot network can generate sustained positive same-store growth, that margins can stabilise, and that returns on capital can climb back into more obviously premium territory. Until then, each new store is treated less as a symbol of boundless runway and more as a unit whose economics must be earned, not presumed. 

This is why Wilcon’s rising dividend matters more now than it would have during the exuberant years. The board approved total cash dividends of ₱0.40 per share in March 2026 — ₱0.14 regular and ₱0.26 special — implying cash returns of roughly ₱1.64bn to shareholders. Market data services also show the stock carrying a yield of around 6 percent. That makes the investment case less about a distant retail empire and more about being paid to wait while management attempts to restore organic momentum.

The deeper lesson is that valuation changes long before a business changes category. Wilcon is still the country’s leading home-improvement retailer, still nationwide, still profitable, still opening stores, and still liquid. Yet its shares now trade much closer to the logic of a cautious cash-flow instrument than to that of a market darling. A retailer once valued for promise is being priced for proof. That is not a verdict of failure. It is simply the market’s reminder that in retail, as in construction, growth unsupported by strong foundations is worth less than it first appears.

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.



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