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The Sys Saw SM Investments’ 2025 Earnings Quality as Fairly Strong

 

A cleaner read of SM Investments Corp.’s 2025 numbers suggests that the conglomerate’s most dependable engines — banking, mall rentals, and food retail — did most of the work, while weaker residential sales and pressure in discretionary businesses kept a lid on how much faster profit could grow.

SM Investments Corp. delivered another year of record profit in 2025, but the more revealing story was not the headline growth rate. It was the composition of that growth. Consolidated earnings rose 10% to ₱90.5 billion on revenues of ₱681.7 billion, up 4%, and the group’s earnings mix remained anchored by banking at 49%, followed by property at 27%, retail at 18%, and portfolio investments at 6%. Those numbers point to a conglomerate whose profit base is increasingly shaped by recurring and essential-demand businesses rather than by the most economically sensitive parts of its portfolio. 

That matters because SM is often shorthand for malls and shopping, a proxy for Philippine consumer momentum. But the 2025 results show something more nuanced: the company’s strongest earnings support came from businesses that can keep compounding even when households become more selective. In other words, the defensive core did the heavy lifting. Banking produced the largest share of group profit, mall leasing provided recurring property income, and food retail continued to expand with stable margins. By contrast, some of the businesses investors typically count on for cyclical upside — notably residential property, specialty retail, and mining exposure through Atlas — either slowed or weighed on the broader picture. 

The clearest proof sits in the banks. BDO Unibank posted ₱87.2 billion in net income, up 6%, while China Banking Corp. earned ₱28.0 billion, up 13%, supported by 13% loan growth at both institutions, expanding deposits, and stable asset quality. BDO’s non-performing loan ratio improved to 1.68%, while Chinabank’s held at 1.6%. This was not volatile or one-off profit. It was broad-based growth from lending, transaction services, savings, and disciplined risk management — the sort of earnings stream that gives a holding company ballast when more cyclical units wobble. 

Property told a similar story, but with a split personality. SM Prime Holdings’ net income rose 7% to ₱48.8 billion, yet most of the strength came not from development sales but from malls, where revenue climbed 7% to ₱85.1 billion, and net income surged 27% to ₱35.2 billion. Management explicitly described property growth as being anchored by recurring income from malls, with rental revenues up 6% and hotels and convention centers also posting gains. That is the more durable side of SM’s property machine: lease escalations, occupancy, and the advantages of owning the ecosystem in which its own retail formats are often anchor tenants.

The weakness, however, was just as instructive. Residential revenue fell 11% to ₱42.5 billion, while residential net income dropped 32% to ₱9.0 billion. Reservation sales shrank 22% to ₱48.9 billion, and management cited slower revenue recognition and softer demand in Metro Manila. For investors trying to judge the quality of SM’s 2025 earnings, that breakdown is crucial. The group did not rely on the most cyclical slice of property to deliver its growth. In fact, residential was a drag, and the fact that SM still produced record profit despite that weakness arguably says more about the resilience of its core than the headline number alone. 

Retail offered the same pattern in miniature. SM Retail’s revenue increased 5% to ₱458.1 billion, but net income rose only 1% to ₱21.1 billion, a sign that not all sales growth translated equally into profit. The most dependable performance came from the Food Group, where revenues rose 7% to ₱271.2 billion and net income also increased 7% to ₱12.0 billion, driven by volumes, store expansion and stable margins. That is the consumer exposure investors tend to value more highly during uncertain periods: groceries and daily essentials bought regardless of whether households are delaying larger discretionary purchases.

The more cyclical retail units were less helpful. Specialty retail revenue still rose 4% to ₱101.0 billion, but net income fell 19% to ₱6.2 billion, with weakness in sports and home categories hitting profitability. SM Store, meanwhile, delivered a better result, with net income rising 11% to ₱4.3 billion, helped by operating leverage and stronger categories such as fashion and kids. The takeaway is not that discretionary retail collapsed; it did not. Rather, it became less efficient as a profit generator than essentials retail. Revenue was there, but margin quality was uneven. For a conglomerate the size of SM, that difference matters.

The portfolio investments book was similarly mixed, and that mix helps explain why cyclicals were a drag only in selected pockets rather than across the board. PGPC, one of the more defensive assets in the portfolio, saw net income fall to ₱1.6 billion, down 46%, because of lower spot energy prices. NEO remained steady at ₱2.5 billion, up 8%, while 2GO improved to ₱1.0 billion, up 29%, reflecting a broader operational turnaround. But Atlas Mining swung to a ₱0.1 billion loss, with the company citing ongoing pre-stripping, making it one of the clearest examples of a cyclical headwind inside the group.

That leaves SM Investments in an interesting position as it heads further into 2026. The conglomerate’s diversity is often described as a source of strategic strength, but the 2025 numbers sharpen that argument into something more practical: diversification only matters if the higher-quality earnings streams are large enough to absorb volatility elsewhere. In SM’s case, they were. Banking remained the dominant engine. Malls generated predictable cash flow. Food retail kept expanding. And those businesses were strong enough to offset the drag from residential, softer specialty margins, and losses at Atlas.

For investors, that makes the year’s results look better than a quick read might suggest. A conglomerate can post earnings growth for any number of reasons — asset sales, accounting gains, or a late-cycle pop in discretionary spending. SM’s 2025 performance looked more grounded than that. The record profit came disproportionately from businesses with recurring demand, entrenched market positions, and less sensitivity to swings in sentiment. The cyclical businesses did not disappear; some, such as hotels and convention centers, even posted healthy growth. But they were not the ones carrying the group.

So the verdict on SM Investments’ 2025 earnings quality is fairly straightforward. It was strong not because every part of the conglomerate fired at once, but because the right parts did. The businesses most capable of producing resilient, repeatable earnings — banking, malls, and food retail — provided the muscle. The businesses most exposed to the cycle — residential property, specialty retail, and Atlas — acted as a restraint. That is not a sign of weakness. If anything, it is evidence that SM’s defensive core is now substantial enough to define the character of the group’s earnings, even when some of the growthier edges disappoint.

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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.


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