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PORTS to PLAY: Razon dwarfs Tanco in Ports, but Tanco's PLUS beats Razon's BLOOM in Gaming


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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.

In Philippine business lore, Enrique Razon Jr. is the undisputed king of the quayside. In ports, the narrative is almost too easy: global scale, big ships, big contracts, big reputation. But business has a way of humbling neat hierarchies—because in gaming, the scoreboard flips. Eusebio Tanco, best known in ports as the Asian Terminals counterweight to ICTSI’s colossus, is the one running away with the casino-and-clicks race.

The punchline is stark: Razon’s Bloomberry Resorts ended 2025 in the red, while Tanco’s DigiPlus is posting surging revenues and hefty profits—with cash piling up fast enough to fund dividends and buybacks in the same breath. 


Bloomberry: Bigger integrated resorts, weaker bottom line

Bloomberry’s 2025 numbers read like a company that worked hard—but couldn’t make the math smile. Consolidated net revenues slipped 1.1% year-on-year to ₱52.51 billion, from ₱53.08 billion in 2024.
Worse, profitability fell off a cliff: EBITDA dropped to ₱10.17 billion in 2025 from ₱16.60 billion in 2024.
And the headline that matters most to investors: Bloomberry booked a consolidated net loss of ₱2.65 billion in 2025, a sharp reversal from ₱2.58 billion net income in 2024

Why the stumble? The story is in the composition of play.

Bloomberry’s net gaming revenues declined 6.5% to ₱39.64 billion, from ₱42.41 billion the year prior.
At the core, the Philippine gaming engine saw a split personality: mass table drop and slot coin-in grew (4.9% and 12.4%), but VIP rolling chip volume fell 32.7%, dragging gaming revenues after PFRS 15 allocation down 5.9% (₱3.3 billion)

At Solaire Entertainment City, the pressure was even more visible: VIP rolling chip volume fell 37%, while mass table drop and slot coin-in also declined (19.3% and 10.4%), driving a 24.9% drop in gaming revenues after PFRS 15 allocation (down ₱12.1 billion).
Bloomberry notes visitor counts at Solaire Entertainment City at 4,603,340 in 2025, down 8.9%

Solaire North, meanwhile, is growing—fast—but growth is not instantly profitability. Bloomberry’s second property commenced operations May 25, 2024, meaning 2025 is its first full year of scale-up.
Solaire North’s volumes surged (VIP, mass, and slots all sharply higher), and gross gaming revenue there rose accordingly.
But ramping a new resort is expensive, and 2025 carried heavy charges: depreciation and amortization climbed to ₱7.48 billion, while interest expense remained massive at ₱8.06 billion.
When you’re paying that kind of “rent” to capital—depreciation on fresh build plus financing cost—your operating performance has to be exceptional just to break even. 

Add to that the broader regulatory climate weighing on industry online play: Bloomberry itself cites momentum in proposed online gambling restrictions and the resulting de-linking of online gaming platforms from e-wallets, which “weighed on industry-wide online gaming revenues,” with uncertainty still lingering.
In other words: even the casino giants aren’t immune to payment-rail politics. 

Bloomberry today looks like a classic integrated resort operator in a transition year: stabilizing a new property, managing a VIP mix shift, absorbing high fixed charges—and fighting for growth while the market’s rules keep moving. 


DigiPlus: The digital gaming machine that prints revenue (and cash)

Now contrast that with DigiPlus, where the 2025 story is less “transition” and more “execution.”

For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, DigiPlus reported ₱66.83 billion in consolidated revenue, up 30% from ₱51.56 billion in the same period of 2024.
The driver is unmistakable: retail games revenue hit ₱65.95 billion, also up 30% year-on-year.

Profitability followed—despite surging costs. DigiPlus posted operating income of ₱10.15 billion for 9M 2025 (up 13%), and net income attributable to the parent of ₱10.11 billion (up 16%).
EBITDA climbed to ₱11.13 billion, up 19%.

Yes, costs ballooned—because growth is being bought, not wished for. For 9M 2025, DigiPlus saw sharp increases in franchise fees and taxes (₱25.61B) and advertising and promotion (₱15.63B), alongside higher outside services, salaries, subscription fees, and depreciation.
That spending is the price of scaling customer acquisition and engagement in a hyper-competitive market.

The more telling number is cash. DigiPlus ended September 2025 with ₱19.93 billion in cash and cash equivalents, up 43% from December 2024.
Total assets rose to ₱50.20 billion, while total liabilities fell 9% to ₱11.77 billion.
That balance sheet posture—more cash, less liabilities—is what lets management do both offense and defense at once.

And DigiPlus had to play defense in 2025. The company explicitly flags regulatory tightening, including PAGCOR directives and BSP guidance that pushed e-wallet operators (including GCash and Maya) to restrict and delink gaming transactions, temporarily disrupting volumes and engagement.
DigiPlus’ response: new payment partners, expanded direct bank integrations, and proprietary gateway improvements.
That is what digital operators live or die on: resilience of rails.

Still, DigiPlus is not pretending Q3 was perfect. For the quarter ended September 30, 2025, revenue was broadly flat year-on-year, but net income fell to ₱1.71 billion from ₱3.52 billion, reflecting the same disruption plus higher costs.
Yet the nine-month picture stayed decisively positive—proof that the business is not a one-quarter wonder. 

Operationally, DigiPlus continues to blend digital and physical reach: it reported 139 land-based sites in operation as of September 30, 2025, supporting omnichannel acquisition and brand presence.
It also laid out a strategy of building a more independent ecosystem post-delinking, while investing in platform features, engagement initiatives, and data/AI to tighten marketing efficiency and retention. 


So who “wins” gaming—and what does it say about business power?

If ports are about moats built from scale, infrastructure, and long concessions, gaming—especially today’s Philippine gaming—looks more like a high-frequency contest: customer acquisition, payment friction, regulatory navigation, product iteration, and brand stickiness. That’s the arena DigiPlus is built for.

Bloomberry is doing what integrated resorts do: investing billions, expanding physical footprint, and grinding through the ramp-up curve while a key VIP segment softens and financing/depreciation remain heavy.

DigiPlus is doing what digital gaming winners do: growing revenues quickly, tolerating high marketing and franchise costs, and still converting enough of that top-line into cash and profits to reward shareholders and reinvest.

And that’s the deeper irony behind the “ports vs play” comparison: the bigger tycoon doesn’t always win the bigger consumer game. Razon may dwarf Tanco at the pier, but at the virtual casino table—and increasingly, the national gaming wallet—Tanco’s DigiPlus is the one holding the hot hand.

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us!

Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.


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