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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.
Bloomberry Resorts Corp. (BLOOM) ended 2025 with a set of numbers that read like a case study in timing risk: the group added a new earnings pillar through Solaire Resort North (SR North) and rolled out MegaFUNalo!, its broad-mass digital gaming platform—both of which raised the cost base—just as the legacy Solaire Entertainment City operation ran into a VIP-led downturn and a weaker hold rate. The result was a sharp compression in EBITDA and a marked decline in operating cash flow, pushing the company into the red for the year.
The headline: from profit to loss, with EBITDA taking the brunt
Bloomberry swung to a net loss of about ₱2.6 billion in 2025 from a roughly ₱2.6 billion net income in 2024, even as revenue stayed broadly flat—an outcome that underscores how quickly profitability can deteriorate when operating leverage works against you.
The clearest signal came from operating earnings: consolidated EBITDA fell 38.7% to ₱10.2 billion, and the EBITDA margin compressed to 19.4% from 31.3% a year earlier—an unusually steep contraction for a mature integrated resort operator.
Bloomberry swung to a net loss of about ₱2.6 billion in 2025 from a roughly ₱2.6 billion net income in 2024, even as revenue stayed broadly flat—an outcome that underscores how quickly profitability can deteriorate when operating leverage works against you.
The clearest signal came from operating earnings: consolidated EBITDA fell 38.7% to ₱10.2 billion, and the EBITDA margin compressed to 19.4% from 31.3% a year earlier—an unusually steep contraction for a mature integrated resort operator.
A tale of two Solaires
At the heart of the deterioration is a diverging performance between Bloomberry’s two Philippine properties. SR North—opened in late May 2024—continued its ramp in 2025 and delivered what management effectively describes as a new earnings leg, contributing ₱3.8 billion in EBITDA (up about ₱2.5 billion year-on-year).
But the legacy flagship in Entertainment City moved the other way. Solaire Entertainment City saw a sharp VIP-led downturn, with VIP rolling chip volume down 37%, VIP revenue down 53.8% to ₱7.0 billion, and the VIP hold rate dropping to 2.56% from 3.5% in 2024—an important swing given how sensitive VIP profitability is to both volume and hold.
Even mass-market indicators at the legacy property softened: mass table revenue fell 6.1%, slot revenue fell 13.3%, and visitor count declined 8.9%. Put together, the flagship’s weakening momentum landed at precisely the wrong time—just as Bloomberry was absorbing the full-year operating footprint of its new property and the upfront costs of launching a new digital channel.
At the heart of the deterioration is a diverging performance between Bloomberry’s two Philippine properties. SR North—opened in late May 2024—continued its ramp in 2025 and delivered what management effectively describes as a new earnings leg, contributing ₱3.8 billion in EBITDA (up about ₱2.5 billion year-on-year).
But the legacy flagship in Entertainment City moved the other way. Solaire Entertainment City saw a sharp VIP-led downturn, with VIP rolling chip volume down 37%, VIP revenue down 53.8% to ₱7.0 billion, and the VIP hold rate dropping to 2.56% from 3.5% in 2024—an important swing given how sensitive VIP profitability is to both volume and hold.
Even mass-market indicators at the legacy property softened: mass table revenue fell 6.1%, slot revenue fell 13.3%, and visitor count declined 8.9%. Put together, the flagship’s weakening momentum landed at precisely the wrong time—just as Bloomberry was absorbing the full-year operating footprint of its new property and the upfront costs of launching a new digital channel.
SR North ramped hard — but the group still had to “pay” for growth
SR North’s numbers suggest demand is there: VIP revenue was up 325.4%, mass table revenue up 110.8%, and slots up 116.2%—big increases amplified by 2024’s partial-year base. Outside the casino floor, the property posted 66.1% hotel occupancy, and food-and-beverage covers rose 115.4%, evidence of a real operating ramp rather than a one-off spike.
Yet a ramping resort is not “free.” A newly operating property brings a surge in payroll, utilities, services, and maintenance—costs that arrive immediately, while demand and productivity typically scale over time. In Bloomberry’s case, the company explicitly links the year-on-year increase in Philippine cash operating expenses to the full-year SR North run-rate, alongside spending associated with the digital platform rollout.
SR North’s numbers suggest demand is there: VIP revenue was up 325.4%, mass table revenue up 110.8%, and slots up 116.2%—big increases amplified by 2024’s partial-year base. Outside the casino floor, the property posted 66.1% hotel occupancy, and food-and-beverage covers rose 115.4%, evidence of a real operating ramp rather than a one-off spike.
Yet a ramping resort is not “free.” A newly operating property brings a surge in payroll, utilities, services, and maintenance—costs that arrive immediately, while demand and productivity typically scale over time. In Bloomberry’s case, the company explicitly links the year-on-year increase in Philippine cash operating expenses to the full-year SR North run-rate, alongside spending associated with the digital platform rollout.
MegaFUNalo!: strategic optionality, near-term drag
The other major “new pillar” was MegaFUNalo!, soft-launched on June 8, 2025 as a mass-market digital gaming platform. The strategy is clear: broaden the customer funnel and diversify beyond the physical resort footprint. But in 2025, the platform behaved like most early-stage customer acquisition plays—it cost money upfront. Bloomberry disclosed ₱1.9 billion in MegaFUNalo!-related operating expenses for the year.
That spending showed up across the expense lines. Advertising and promotions surged 172.8%—attributed to the MegaFUNalo! launch and SR North marketing—while other operating categories tied to scale and systems also moved higher, including software and hardware maintenance (+49.1%) and utilities (+30.8%).
To complicate the equation, Bloomberry also flagged regulatory uncertainty around online gaming, noting that policy discussions and enforcement actions—such as advertising suspensions and restrictions affecting e-wallet connections—have weighed on industry online revenues. That uncertainty can raise the hurdle rate for customer acquisition investments, since the path to steady-state economics becomes harder to forecast.
The other major “new pillar” was MegaFUNalo!, soft-launched on June 8, 2025 as a mass-market digital gaming platform. The strategy is clear: broaden the customer funnel and diversify beyond the physical resort footprint. But in 2025, the platform behaved like most early-stage customer acquisition plays—it cost money upfront. Bloomberry disclosed ₱1.9 billion in MegaFUNalo!-related operating expenses for the year.
That spending showed up across the expense lines. Advertising and promotions surged 172.8%—attributed to the MegaFUNalo! launch and SR North marketing—while other operating categories tied to scale and systems also moved higher, including software and hardware maintenance (+49.1%) and utilities (+30.8%).
To complicate the equation, Bloomberry also flagged regulatory uncertainty around online gaming, noting that policy discussions and enforcement actions—such as advertising suspensions and restrictions affecting e-wallet connections—have weighed on industry online revenues. That uncertainty can raise the hurdle rate for customer acquisition investments, since the path to steady-state economics becomes harder to forecast.
Revenue mix: gaming down, non-gaming up — but not enough
On the revenue side, the group’s story is less about collapse and more about mix. Gaming revenue fell 6% to ₱52.7 billion, reflecting the VIP softness at the flagship and a smaller Korea contribution. At the same time, non-gaming lines showed healthy growth: hotel/F&B revenue rose 33.9% and retail/other revenues rose 9.3%, a profile consistent with SR North’s ramp and a larger share of “destination” spend.
But the cost base expanded faster than the revenue mix could compensate. Consolidated expenses rose, with total consolidated expenses up 9.3% to ₱55.2 billion, driven by the combined effects of SR North operations, the MegaFUNalo! launch, and the broader rise in operating expense categories.
Even below the revenue line, a weaker cash position had second-order effects. Interest income fell 30.1% due to lower cash balances, a reminder that as cash cushions shrink, the “small” tailwinds in the income statement can fade.
On the revenue side, the group’s story is less about collapse and more about mix. Gaming revenue fell 6% to ₱52.7 billion, reflecting the VIP softness at the flagship and a smaller Korea contribution. At the same time, non-gaming lines showed healthy growth: hotel/F&B revenue rose 33.9% and retail/other revenues rose 9.3%, a profile consistent with SR North’s ramp and a larger share of “destination” spend.
But the cost base expanded faster than the revenue mix could compensate. Consolidated expenses rose, with total consolidated expenses up 9.3% to ₱55.2 billion, driven by the combined effects of SR North operations, the MegaFUNalo! launch, and the broader rise in operating expense categories.
Even below the revenue line, a weaker cash position had second-order effects. Interest income fell 30.1% due to lower cash balances, a reminder that as cash cushions shrink, the “small” tailwinds in the income statement can fade.
The cash flow signal: operating cash halved
If the income statement tells the story of margin compression, the cash flow statement confirms the pressure on financial flexibility. Bloomberry’s net cash from operations dropped 50.7% to ₱8.1 billion, while cash and cash equivalents fell 20.1% to ₱26.5 billion.
This is where the year’s strategic sequencing becomes visible. SR North’s ramp and MegaFUNalo!’s launch increased operating costs and working requirements at the same time the flagship’s VIP engine slowed. That is the classic recipe for a cash squeeze: lower cash earnings (EBITDA) plus higher spending equals less cash generation, even before considering the investing and financing legs of the cash flow equation.
If the income statement tells the story of margin compression, the cash flow statement confirms the pressure on financial flexibility. Bloomberry’s net cash from operations dropped 50.7% to ₱8.1 billion, while cash and cash equivalents fell 20.1% to ₱26.5 billion.
This is where the year’s strategic sequencing becomes visible. SR North’s ramp and MegaFUNalo!’s launch increased operating costs and working requirements at the same time the flagship’s VIP engine slowed. That is the classic recipe for a cash squeeze: lower cash earnings (EBITDA) plus higher spending equals less cash generation, even before considering the investing and financing legs of the cash flow equation.
Balance sheet and ratios: still liquid, but less comfortable
Key balance sheet indicators moved in the wrong direction, though not into distress territory. The current ratio declined to 1.87 from 2.06, and the net debt-to-equity ratio rose to 1.76 from 1.69, pointing to reduced liquidity headroom and a slightly heavier net leverage posture. Meanwhile, return metrics reversed, with ROE at -4.5% from +4.2% a year earlier.
Key balance sheet indicators moved in the wrong direction, though not into distress territory. The current ratio declined to 1.87 from 2.06, and the net debt-to-equity ratio rose to 1.76 from 1.69, pointing to reduced liquidity headroom and a slightly heavier net leverage posture. Meanwhile, return metrics reversed, with ROE at -4.5% from +4.2% a year earlier.
What this means for investors: 2025 looks like an “investment year” that collided with a cyclical dip
The market takeaway is not that Bloomberry’s expansion strategy failed—SR North’s ramp suggests it is taking hold—but that 2025 combined multiple “cash-absorbing” events into one year:
- SR North moved from partial-year to full-year operations, lifting recurring costs and depreciation.
- MegaFUNalo! launched with heavy upfront operating and marketing spend.
- Entertainment City weakened in VIP volume and hold, a double headwind for profitability.
When these three happen simultaneously, the company’s operating leverage flips negative: margins compress quickly, and operating cash flow becomes the first casualty. That is exactly what the year’s EBITDA and operating cash flow figures imply.
The market takeaway is not that Bloomberry’s expansion strategy failed—SR North’s ramp suggests it is taking hold—but that 2025 combined multiple “cash-absorbing” events into one year:
- SR North moved from partial-year to full-year operations, lifting recurring costs and depreciation.
- MegaFUNalo! launched with heavy upfront operating and marketing spend.
- Entertainment City weakened in VIP volume and hold, a double headwind for profitability.
When these three happen simultaneously, the company’s operating leverage flips negative: margins compress quickly, and operating cash flow becomes the first casualty. That is exactly what the year’s EBITDA and operating cash flow figures imply.
The market lens: can 2026 be the “harvest” year?
For 2026, the watchlist is straightforward. First, investors will want to see whether Entertainment City stabilizes—particularly VIP volume and hold—because that property remains a major earnings anchor.
Second, SR North’s early success needs to translate into durable margins as ramp costs normalize and operating efficiencies kick in.
Third, MegaFUNalo! will likely be judged on unit economics: does marketing intensity begin to fall relative to revenue as the platform scales, or does the spend remain structurally high in a competitive and potentially more regulated online environment?
For now, the 2025 report reads as a transitional year: the company built new growth engines, but the legacy engine sputtered at the same time. The next leg—whether Bloomberry can convert those investments into stronger cash generation—will determine whether 2025’s margin compression was a temporary trough or the start of a tougher profitability regime.
We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us!
For 2026, the watchlist is straightforward. First, investors will want to see whether Entertainment City stabilizes—particularly VIP volume and hold—because that property remains a major earnings anchor.
Second, SR North’s early success needs to translate into durable margins as ramp costs normalize and operating efficiencies kick in.
Third, MegaFUNalo! will likely be judged on unit economics: does marketing intensity begin to fall relative to revenue as the platform scales, or does the spend remain structurally high in a competitive and potentially more regulated online environment?
For now, the 2025 report reads as a transitional year: the company built new growth engines, but the legacy engine sputtered at the same time. The next leg—whether Bloomberry can convert those investments into stronger cash generation—will determine whether 2025’s margin compression was a temporary trough or the start of a tougher profitability regime.
We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us!
Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.
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