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Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.
At a time when Jollibee Foods Corp. (JFC) chairman Tony Tancaktiong is aggressively expanding overseas—snapping up food and beverage brands across North America, Europe, and Asia—the absence of one very visible local target is becoming increasingly conspicuous: MerryMart Consumer Corp.
MerryMart’s share price, now hovering near all‑time lows as shown by its long downward trend since listing, reflects a market that has largely lost faith in founder Injap Sia’s vision of building a nationwide mass‑market retail champion. What makes this skepticism more striking is that, on paper, MerryMart looks like the kind of company JFC could easily buy, fix, and scale.
Yet it remains completely off JFC’s radar.
A “Pacman” With a Clear Playbook
Tony Tancaktiong is increasingly being likened to the late Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco, who earned the moniker “Pacman” for San Miguel Corp.’s relentless acquisition of businesses across food, beverage, infrastructure, and energy. Instead of aggressively returning cash to shareholders via outsized dividends or buybacks, JFC has opted to reinvest heavily into overseas expansion, doubling down on its ambition to become a truly global foodservice group.
JFC’s recent acquisitions have shared several common traits:
- Strong brand equity
- Clear unit economics
- Proven consumer demand
- Scalability across geographies
Whether it is Smashburger, Tim Ho Wan, or regional coffee and fast‑casual concepts, JFC has consistently bought into businesses where the consumer proposition is already validated. Execution risk exists, but the core demand does not.
MerryMart, by contrast, remains a concept still searching for proof of scale.
Retail Is Not Food—and the Market Knows It
While Injap Sia successfully built Mang Inasal into a national brand (and sold it to JFC), grocery retail is a fundamentally different business. It is:
- Capital‑intensive
- Low‑margin
- Highly sensitive to logistics, shrinkage, and pricing discipline
Even global giants like Tesco and Carrefour have struggled in emerging markets without overwhelming scale and supply‑chain advantages.
The market’s verdict on MerryMart has been brutal but consistent. Despite store expansion narratives and multiple business pivots, investors have not seen evidence of operating leverage, durable margins, or defensible differentiation against entrenched players like SM Retail, Puregold, Robinsons Retail, and even hard‑discount formats.
For an acquirer like JFC, this is a red flag.
Why JFC Could Buy MerryMart—but Won’t (For Now)
There is no question that JFC has the balance sheet, cash flow, and managerial depth to acquire MerryMart at today’s depressed valuation. In theory, JFC could:
- Inject capital
- Impose execution discipline
- Leverage procurement and real estate relationships
- Scale the footprint faster than MerryMart can on its own
But JFC has historically avoided businesses where turnaround risk outweighs strategic upside.
More importantly, MerryMart does not naturally plug into JFC’s core strength: foodservice and branded dining experiences. Unlike convenience stores that can be tightly integrated with ready‑to‑eat food, grocery retail offers fewer synergies with JFC’s existing ecosystem.
In short, MerryMart is not a platform JFC can easily “Jollibee‑fy.”
A Silent Market Signal
Markets are often louder in what doesn’t happen than in what does. The lack of strategic interest from deep‑pocketed local conglomerates—especially JFC—is being read by investors as a quiet but powerful signal: smart capital is unconvinced.
If MerryMart’s vision were compelling at scale, it would not be trading at a valuation that implies perpetual stagnation. Strategic buyers tend to move early when they see optionality. JFC’s continued silence suggests it sees none.
The Bottom Line
Tony Tancaktiong’s acquisition spree underscores a critical distinction: not all growth stories are worth buying, even at a discount. While JFC continues to chase global food brands with proven demand and replicable economics, MerryMart remains a domestic retail experiment that the market—and potential strategic buyers—are unwilling to underwrite.
Until MerryMart demonstrates clear, sustainable profitability and a defensible retail edge, it will likely remain what its share price already implies: a founder‑led vision without institutional conviction.
For now, the Pac-Man is eating elsewhere.
We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us!
Disclaimer: This is for informational purposes and is not investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs.
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