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The 2026 Dividend Test for DDMPR: When Lease Expiries Meet a Tenant’s Market



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Investors buy REITs for one thing above all: reliable distributions. And for DDMP REIT, Inc. (DDMPR), the big question heading into 2026 isn’t whether offices will remain relevant (they will), but whether cash flows can stay steady enough to keep dividends resilient through a year that looks unusually heavy on lease rollovers. The clues are already in the company’s disclosures: short lease tenors, a large lease-expiry concentration in 2026, and a Metro Manila market where tenants still have negotiating leverage despite a visible rebound in demand. 

The cliff: 2026 is when the lease math gets real

DDMPR’s own lease expiry profile flags the heart of the matter: 56.94% of total gross leasable area (GLA) expires in 2026—a striking concentration for any income vehicle that promises quarterly predictability. Add to that a portfolio weighted average lease expiry (WALE) of 1.76 years (with DoubleDragon Plaza at 1.20 years and Center West at 1.30 years), and the story becomes clear: the REIT must re-price or re-secure a large portion of its income base in relatively short order. 

For DPU (dividend per unit), that’s not a theoretical risk—it’s the main event. When leases roll, the outcomes tend to land in one of three buckets: same tenant renews at similar economics (best case), renews but with concessions (the common middle), or vacates, requiring time and incentives to backfill (the painful case). In 2026, DDMPR’s exposure to that roulette wheel is simply larger than usual. 

A revenue base that’s concentrated—and therefore sensitive

DDMPR’s disclosures show that dividend durability is mostly a function of two properties, not three. For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, DoubleDragon Plaza delivered ₱910.98 million in rental income (78.78% of the total) and DoubleDragon Center West contributed ₱232.15 million (20.08%). Center East contributed only ₱5.65 million (0.49%)—a rounding error in DPU terms, at least for now. 

That concentration means 2026 DPU risk is less about “the complex” in the abstract and more about whether the Plaza’s leasing story holds together through the expiry wave. Plaza occupancy was 73.71% as of September 30, 2025, while Center West was 95.19%—a reminder that not all towers are currently pulling equal weight. If Plaza stumbles—through non-renewals, slower backfills, or deeper concessions—DPU could feel it quickly because Plaza is the portfolio’s economic backbone. 

The market problem: tenants still have leverage

The broader office market context matters because it sets the negotiating table for renewals. Colliers reported Metro Manila office vacancy easing to 19.8% in Q3 2025—a modest improvement, but still a level that encourages tenants to push for better terms. JLL’s Grade A indicators for Makati and Taguig show vacancy improving to 13.9% in Q3 2025, with rents broadly steady at around PHP 1,101.8 per sqm per month, alongside commentary that landlords have adopted conservative pricing to retain occupancy amid pipeline pressures.

In other words, demand is recovering, but the market is not yet tight enough to hand landlords a clean renewal cycle. That’s the practical risk for 2026: renewal spreads may come in weak, and even when headline rent holds, effective rent can drop once concessions are counted. 

The “silent killer” of DPU: incentives and timing gaps

DDMPR’s 2025 numbers already illustrate how lease timing affects income. For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, rent income fell 13.5% year-on-year, with management citing expired leases that “will be replaced by incoming tenants.” That line is important: it implies the REIT is experiencing (or recently experienced) a gap between lease expiry and replacement rent commencement

In 2026, with over half of GLA expiring, the risk isn’t just whether space eventually gets leased—it’s how long the cash flow takes to normalize. Even a few months of downtime across multiple large leases can compress distributable cash for the year. And if renewals require rent-free periods or landlord-funded fit-outs—common in a tenant-favorable market—the REIT could “win” occupancy while still losing near-term cash flow. 

Center East: not a DPU driver—yet still a strategic risk

Much investor attention has focused on DoubleDragon Center East, which showed 6.63% occupancy as of September 30, 2025—extraordinarily low compared with Center West. From a pure DPU perspective, East is not the primary issue today precisely because it contributes so little to rent income. 

But East can still matter in 2026 as a “management bandwidth” and “pricing anchor” risk. A struggling tower often demands aggressive leasing packages to move the needle, and those packages can influence perceptions of achievable rents across adjacent assets. In a renewal-heavy year, DDMPR’s competitive positioning will be judged on how well it manages renewals at the core assets while simultaneously proving it can lease up weaker inventory without undermining portfolio economics. 

Credit and collections: DPU depends on cash, not just accounting income

REIT distributions ultimately rely on cash collections. DDMPR reported rent receivables of ₱1.66 billion as of September 30, 2025 and carried a substantial impairment allowance of ₱645.3 million. Net receivables increased versus year-end 2024, with management noting this was mainly due to higher rent receivables. 

This doesn’t automatically signal distress—but it does put a spotlight on collection efficiency and tenant quality, especially during rollover periods when some tenants negotiate hard, restructure footprints, or delay commitments. If receivables rise or collections lag during 2026 renewals, distributable cash could feel tighter than “distributable income” suggests. 

Supply keeps the pressure on (and reinforces tenant bargaining power)

CBRE noted that developers continued adding to Metro Manila supply in 2025 (including a ~30,000 sqm completion in Quezon City from SM North Towers), while office transactions remained active—signaling both opportunities to lease and continued competition among landlords. Colliers similarly emphasized that landlords must differentiate via ESG features, tenant experience, and flexible strategies—a tacit acknowledgment that competition still shapes pricing power. 

For DDMPR, that means the 2026 renewal cycle will likely occur under conditions where many tenants can credibly say, “If you won’t match the market, someone else will.”

The one structural comfort: no debt—but leasing risk remains

There is, however, a mitigating factor worth underlining: DDMPR disclosed that it has no bank and intercompany debts, reducing refinancing shocks and interest-rate transmission risk to distributions. That’s a stabilizer compared with leveraged landlords. But it doesn’t erase the central vulnerability of 2026: leasing outcomes—occupancy, effective rent, and timing. 


What investors should watch as 2026 approaches

If you want a practical “DPU risk dashboard,” focus on these signals:

  • Renewal visibility ahead of 2026: pre-commitments, signed renewals, and early disclosures on renewal terms. 
  • DoubleDragon Plaza occupancy trend: because it is the dominant rent contributor. 
  • Concessions and leasing costs: any re-acceleration in leasing commissions/marketing or signs of heavier incentives. 
  • Collections quality: receivable aging, impairment movements, and operating cash flow alignment with reported income. 

Bottom line

In 2026, DDMPR’s DPU story becomes a renewal execution story, with the spotlight on how effectively the REIT navigates a 56.94% GLA expiry concentration in a market that remains competitive and tenant-friendly. Investors should treat 2026 less like a routine year of distributions and more like a stress test—not of balance sheet leverage, but of leasing discipline, tenant retention, and cash conversion. 

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