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Margin Squeeze at Victorias Milling: When Bigger Sales Don’t Mean Bigger Profits

 


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Victorias Milling Company (VMC) just delivered the kind of headline that usually excites the market: revenues surged. But if you read past the topline, the quarter is really a case study in something investors underestimate until it bites—margin compression.

In the three months ended November 30, 2025, VMC reported consolidated revenue of ₱3.235 billion, up from ₱2.511 billion a year earlier. Yet net income slid to ₱161.5 million from ₱367.9 million, and EPS fell to ₱0.03 from ₱0.07. The company’s own management discussion captures the paradox: strong sales growth masking “significant operational challenges” that squeezed profitability. 

The anatomy of the squeeze

Margin compression is not a mystery here—it’s arithmetic.

VMC’s cost of sales and services expanded to ₱2.934 billion from ₱2.095 billion, outpacing the revenue gain. That pushed gross profit down to ₱301.2 million from ₱416.7 million. In plain terms: VMC sold more, but kept less. 

Translate those into margins, and the story sharpens. Gross profit of ₱301 million on ₱3.235 billion in revenue implies a gross margin of about 9%, versus roughly 17% a year ago based on the same line items. Management’s own KPI table shows the end result further down the P&L: net income margin fell to 5% from 15%, with returns on assets and equity also dropping. 

This is the uncomfortable truth of commodity-linked businesses: volume and revenue can rise while economics deteriorate.

One quarter, one big margin culprit: the write-down

The most explicit margin hit is sitting in the cost line: VMC recognized ₱222.1 million in inventory write-down and obsolescence during the quarter, attributed to changes in market prices of molasses and raw sugar. This is not a footnote—this is a material drag embedded directly into the cost of sales, which mechanically compresses gross margin. 

Write-downs are often a management “tell.” They can signal that (1) the market moved against you faster than you could adjust pricing or inventory posture, or (2) you held inventory for operational reasons that made sense at the time—but now carries a lower realizable value. Either way, the impact is immediate: profitability today pays for yesterday’s price reality

Mix matters: goods up, services down

Another driver of margin pressure is revenue composition.

  • Sale of goods rose to ₱3.096 billion from ₱1.919 billion.
  • But service income collapsed to ₱139.7 million from ₱592.7 million

Service income in industrial-agri businesses can be structurally different from pure trading revenue—often steadier, sometimes higher quality depending on the nature of the service (milling, tolling, fees). Here, the plunge in service income suggests the quarter leaned harder on product sales just as sugar conditions were deteriorating. That’s a recipe for lower blended margins—especially when commodity pricing is soft, and production costs are rising. 

The segment split: sugar bled, renewables carried

If VMC’s consolidated margins compressed, it’s because the sugar business buckled while renewables did the heavy lifting.

  • Sugar milling & refinery posted ₱1.678 billion in revenue but swung to a ₱426.3 million net loss, from a ₱177.8 million net income a year earlier. 
  • Renewable energy operations delivered ₱1.513 billion in revenue and ₱583.1 million net income, up from ₱214.2 million last year. 

Management points to an ugly cocktail hitting sugar: lower production, downward pressure on local sugar prices due to high carryover stocks, and operational difficulties, including lower recovery rates from pest infestation and typhoons in Negros Occidental—all of which raised production costs. This is classic margin compression: price pressure + cost inflation + operational disruption. 

Meanwhile, renewables benefited from capacity and scaling tailwinds. The filing notes a distillery expansion implemented in July 2025, lifting daily capacity to 180,000 liters, and power operations with 93MW registered capacity as of quarter-end. Renewables didn’t just contribute—it arguably rescued consolidated profitability from what could have been a much harsher earnings print. 

Costs didn’t stop at COGS

Below gross profit, the squeeze continues.

Operating expenses rose to ₱218.6 million from ₱187.0 million. Even if you grant that scaling businesses incur higher overhead, the timing matters: when gross margin narrows, every incremental peso of opex becomes more “expensive” as a share of revenue. 

And “other income” provided less relief than last year—₱96.7 million vs ₱134.7 million. So the usual cushions (fees, FX gains, investment gains) were thinner, leaving the core margin story more exposed.

Balance sheet strength: the quiet counterpoint

Here’s what prevents margin compression from becoming a crisis: financial resilience.

VMC ended the quarter with ₱16.1 billion in total assets and ₱13.6 billion in equity, while keeping liabilities relatively low at ₱2.56 billion. Management highlights zero outstanding loans, a current ratio of 3.62, and a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.19—a strong posture for riding through a difficult commodity cycle. 

But even here, the margin story leaves fingerprints: inventories climbed to ₱1.791 billion from ₱1.385 billion since August 31, 2025. Inventory build can be operationally necessary, but in volatile markets it increases exposure to further write-down risk and working-capital drag. 

What this quarter is really saying

This isn’t a “bad company” quarter—it’s a margin narrative quarter.

VMC’s topline strength—especially the surge in ethanol and refined sugar sales noted in management’s discussion—shows demand and capacity. But the quarter also demonstrates that earning power is currently constrained by realities that don’t yield easily to volume: weather disruptions, biological risks (pests), sugar recovery rates, and commodity price dynamics. 

The strategic implication is just as clear: the company’s diversification into renewables isn’t optional anymore—it’s stabilizing. The renewables segment’s profit contribution provides a counterweight to sugar’s cyclicality and, in quarters like this, can mean the difference between reporting a profit and reporting a loss. 

Investor takeaway: watch margins first, revenue second

If you’re tracking VMC, don’t let revenue growth lull you into complacency. The tell will be whether margins recover as:

  • recovery rates normalize (post-pest, post-typhoon),
  • price pressure eases,
  • and inventory write-downs stop being a recurring feature. 

Until then, the quarter stands as a reminder that in commodity-heavy businesses, the income statement’s most important line is not the first one. It’s the margin lines in the middle.

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