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Campus Cashflows: FEU vs CEU—Two Education Stocks, Two Very Different Dividend Stories




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In the quiet corner of the Philippine market where education stocks trade more like utility shares than growth rockets, two names keep resurfacing in income investors’ watchlists: Far Eastern University (FEU) and Centro Escolar University (CEU). Their latest interim numbers (six months ended Nov. 30, 2025) show something that may surprise casual observers: both are running at nearly the same net margin, yet the market prices them—and their dividends—very differently. 

Same margins, different narratives

FEU reported ₱2.52 billion in revenues for the first half, up 8% year-on-year, powered by strong intake and retention across its campuses and affiliate schools. Yet earnings slipped modestly: net income fell 3% to ₱635.0 million, and management was explicit about why—operating expenses grew faster (+11%) as the group spent on faculty development, data and digital systems, program expansion, and new sites. In other words: FEU is spending now to defend relevance later

CEU’s half-year results look calmer. Consolidated gross revenue came in at ₱1.12 billion, with net income of ₱280.1 million, slightly ahead of the prior year. CEU’s operating discussion reads like a familiar tuition-and-fees machine: steady collections, controlled spending, and a reminder that seasonality is real (typically fewer students in later terms). The headline is stability—no fireworks, but no drama either. [

Here’s the kicker: when you run the simple math, both schools are producing ~25% net margins on their interim revenue bases—FEU at roughly 25.2%, CEU at roughly 25.1%. That’s rare symmetry in a market that loves to exaggerate differences. 

Balance sheets: both are liquid, but FEU has a wider cushion

FEU’s balance sheet reads like that of a mature institution with a sizable investment portfolio. As of Nov. 30, 2025, the group had ₱20.8 billion in total assets, ₱1.59 billion in cash and cash equivalents, and a 2.01x current ratio—a comfortable liquidity posture even after paying dividends and making placements. It also framed its jump in liabilities as largely seasonal deferred tuition revenue rather than structural leverage. 

CEU also looks liquid, with ₱1.31 billion in cash and cash equivalents as of Nov. 30, 2025, and management saying it expects no liquidity issues over the next 12 months. But its current ratio sits at 1.31x, fine but tighter, and its balance sheet includes a large “dividends payable” line item (about ₱790 million) that’s been persistent across reporting dates—something income investors should at least notice and understand operationally (often unclaimed declared dividends, but still a payable). 

Valuation: “cheap” depends on which earnings you believe

As of mid‑January 2026, PSE EDGE shows FEU trading around ₱801 with a market capitalization near ₱19.27 billion. CEU trades around ₱16.30, with a market cap of about ₱7.28 billion. 

On valuation, FEU is a textbook case of why investors must choose their lens. FEU’s own KPI table shows FY (May 31, 2025) EPS of ₱85.94, which makes the stock look ~9x P/E at ₱801—classic “defensive value.” But its six‑month EPS is ₱25.72; annualize that, and the multiple becomes meaningfully higher—closer to mid‑teens—if you assume the first half reflects a new run‑rate while strategic costs remain elevated. 

CEU’s interim EPS is ₱0.63 for six months; annualized, that points to a low‑teens P/E at ₱16.30. Some market data aggregators peg CEU’s trailing EPS around ₱1.56, putting it around ~10–11x trailing P/E, broadly in the same neighborhood as FEU on a trailing basis. That makes the valuation debate less about “cheap vs expensive,” and more about which earnings path you trust: FEU’s reinvestment cycle or CEU’s steadier glide. 

On book value, CEU looks cheaper: with its Nov. 30, 2025, equity of ₱6.53 billion, it trades not far above book (roughly 1.1x). FEU trades at a higher premium to book (roughly mid‑1x), consistent with investors assigning more franchise value to its multi‑campus network and scale. 

Dividends: reliability versus headline yield

This is where the two schools sharply diverge.

FEU’s dividend story is boring—in the best way. It declared and paid cash dividends of ₱16 per share twice in 2025 (paid March 18 and October 16), reinforcing a semi‑annual habit that income investors can model. The interim report also references the October ₱16 dividend totaling ₱384.9 million, paid from operating cash flows. Add the two ₱16 payouts and the trailing cash dividend is ₱32, which at ₱801 implies roughly a ~4% yield—not spectacular, but predictable

CEU’s yield looks higher, but the cadence is less “clockwork.” CEU disclosed a ₱1.40 per share cash dividend declared May 30, 2025, payable August 4, 2025. At ₱16.30, that’s roughly an ~8.6% cash yield—more than double FEU’s headline yield. But CEU’s own 17‑Q also says no dividends were declared or distributed during June–November 2025, consistent with the timing (declared just before June) but illustrative of an annual/episodic schedule rather than FEU’s semiannual rhythm.

The deeper reliability question is coverage. CEU’s annual cash dividend of ₱1.40 is large relative to its interim earnings pace (₱0.63 for six months), implying dependence on stronger second-half profitability or accumulated retained earnings. FEU’s ₱32 annual cash dividend looks more comfortably covered against its last audited annual EPS (₱85.94), even if the current half-year is softer. 

The investor takeaway

If you’re building a portfolio where dividends must feel like rent checks, FEU remains the more “bond-like” education equity: moderate yield, repeatable schedule, and a liquidity profile that supports continuity. 

If you’re willing to accept more variability in dividend pattern and coverage in exchange for a higher cash yield, CEU is the more aggressive income proposition—especially when priced for high yield—though you’ll want to watch earnings coverage and the mechanics behind its sizable dividends payable line.

In short: FEU pays like a metronome. CEU pays like a drum solo—louder, but not always on the same beat. 

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