From PCIBank to Platform Plays: The Lopez Group’s 1999 Exit—and the Cautionary Aftermath Now Shadowing Any “ABS-CBN Rescue” Talk

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When Benpres Holdings Corp. (now Lopez Holdings Corp.) exited PCIBank in 1999, management sold the transaction as a strategic reset: redeploy capital toward “communications and utilities” and fund an emerging convergence play spanning broadcast, cable, telecoms, and infrastructure. Benpres later said outright that it sold PCIBank to focus on these core businesses, booking a one-time gain that helped cushion other one-off charges in the group’s portfolio.

But the market’s memory of what came after the bank exit is less tidy. Two of the headline investments that stood to benefit most from the pivot—Bayan Telecommunications (Bayantel) and Maynilad Water Services, Inc.—both later entered court-supervised rehabilitation (and, in Maynilad’s case, a concession breakdown and arbitration that effectively ended the original operating path under the earlier shareholder group).

That history matters again today as the Lopez group’s power arm, First Gen Corp. (FGEN), has booked a fresh cash “windfall” from a major gas asset sale—prompting market speculation about how far the group might go in financially backstopping ABS-CBN’s long recovery. The more grounded reading: the group’s prior experience with rescue-heavy bets may have taught a costly lesson in capital discipline.

The PCIBank Exit: A Value Realization, Not a Passive Retreat

Benpres did not walk away from PCIBank as a passive minority holder. In December 1998, it disclosed it had increased its PCIBank holdings from about 17.8% to 30% through a PSE crossing—buying a block from businessman William Gatchalian at ₱130 per share. The company positioned the move as compelling valuation and pointed to the stock’s sharp post-transaction move as validation. 

By 1999, Benpres participated in a coordinated sale process that allowed it to crystallize gains and redeploy capital. In its own 1999 annual report narrative, Benpres said it sold PCIBank to focus on communications and utilities, and explicitly tied the sale’s one-time gain to balance-sheet triage—offsetting a one-off provisioning hit elsewhere in the portfolio. 

Where the Pivot Went: Two Big Bets, Two Deep Restructurings

Bayantel: Leverage, Defaults, and Court Rehabilitation

By 2003, BayanTel’s capital structure had become the problem. It was reported that the Pasig RTC issued a stay order freezing debt enforcement actions and appointed a rehabilitation receiver, after a rehabilitation petition was filed through the Bank of New York on behalf of bondholders. The report cited recurring losses and accumulated deficits that impaired the firm’s ability to service obligations.

The Bayantel restructuring later escalated into complex litigation, reaching the Supreme Court in consolidated cases tied to the telecom’s corporate rehabilitation framework and creditor disputes—illustrating how long and technical these “rescues” can become once the debt stack breaks.

Maynilad: Concession Economics, FX/Tariff Friction, and Court Protection

Maynilad’s distress was more visible because it sat inside a public-utility concession. A SUEZ disclosure dated February 2003 said Maynilad terminated its contract after failed negotiations with MWSS and cited disputes over contractual clauses meant to preserve economic viability post-Asian crisis—moving the conflict to arbitration. 

By November 2003, Maynilad filed for corporate rehabilitation; Supreme Court records confirm the rehabilitation court issued a stay order (Nov. 17, 2003) and detail the legal fight over drawing on credit support instruments during rehabilitation.

The New Question: Will the Group Use FGEN’s “Windfall” to Rescue ABS-CBN?

What the “windfall” is

In 2025, First Gen agreed to sell 60% of its gas business to Enrique Razon-led Prime Infrastructure for at least ₱50 billion, retaining 40% of the gas plants and taking a minority position in the LNG terminal structure.
Newspaper reports described the proceeds as fresh funds and noted delisting as one of the options being considered post-transaction, while also quoting management commentary that the proceeds would be channeled primarily toward renewable expansion (geothermal).

Key point for allocation debates: public statements around the gas-sale proceeds have emphasized reinvestment into renewables, not a capital transfer to unrelated group needs.

What ABS-CBN’s funding need looks like today

ABS-CBN remains in active discussions with lenders on extensions to loan agreement deadlines and waivers, while continuing to manage liquidity through asset sales and operating adjustments, according to recent reporting based on corporate filings.

Lopez Holdings’ own communications to shareholders highlight how ABS-CBN’s impairments and losses have affected the holding firm’s equity share results, even as the group’s broader portfolio remains anchored by First Philippine Holdings and First Gen.

Market Read-Through (Opinion): “Rescue appetite” may be lower after Bayantel/Maynilad

This is analysis, not a statement of intent, but the logic is straightforward: the group has already lived through a painful cycle where capital was redeployed out of banking into leveraged platform plays—only to spend years managing restructurings in both telecoms and water. Those experiences tend to harden capital discipline, especially when investors can point to long, value-destructive cleanups as the end state. 

That history supports a reasonable market inference: even if First Gen generates a large cash pool, the Lopez group may be less inclined to deploy it as a broad, open-ended rescue package for ABS-CBN, particularly if that would dilute First Gen’s reinvestment agenda or trigger governance scrutiny from public shareholders. The group’s stated posture for First Gen’s proceeds—renewable build-out—leans toward reinvestment in the power platform rather than cross-subsidizing media. 

Why that inference is plausible

• First Gen’s proceeds are being positioned as a “war chest” for renewables, with management messaging around geothermal expansion and energy transition—uses that are aligned with the company’s core investor proposition. 
• ABS-CBN’s near-term liquidity strategy (per recent reporting) is creditor negotiation + asset sales + operating adjustments, not necessarily a single large “sponsor bailout” transfer. 
• The group’s earlier “platform” rescues (Bayantel, Maynilad) show how quickly public-service bets can morph into multi-year restructurings once the debt-regulatory math breaks—an institutional memory likely to temper enthusiasm for writing blank checks.

Where PCIBank “Lives” Today: Inside BDO’s Balance Sheet

If the 1999 exit closed the Lopez group’s banking chapter, PCIBank itself never really disappeared—it was absorbed into the consolidation wave that helped create today’s largest lender. After PCIBank was folded into Equitable PCI Bank through the 1999 combination, the merged institution later merged with Banco de Oro and became part of the entity now known as BDO Unibank.

From an industry perspective, the merger created a scaled platform: press reporting at the time described the combined institution (BDO + Equitable PCI) as forming a larger branch and ATM footprint and consolidating resources into the surviving BDO entity—meaning that the former PCIBank franchise effectively became a material part of what is now the BDO network. 

In short: while Benpres monetized its bank stake and pivoted to telecom and concessions, PCIBank’s franchise—customers, branches, and banking infrastructure—eventually became embedded in BDO’s growth story, via Equitable PCI.

The Lopez group’s divestment from PCIBank was pitched as a pivot into platform plays—communications and utilities—yet the subsequent rehabilitation episodes in telecom and water underscore how quickly leverage and regulation can turn “core” into “crisis.” Still, the banking asset they exited did not vanish; through the Equitable PCI combination and the later BDO merger, PCIBank’s franchise ultimately ended up inside BDO, a consolidation winner that used scale to compound through subsequent cycles.

But there’s a credible counter-view

ABS-CBN remains a strategic and reputational asset in the group’s ecosystem. Lopez Holdings’ public communications still treat ABS-CBN as a major investee whose losses and impairments flow through group results.

If the group believes a targeted cash infusion could produce a high-confidence payoff—e.g., retiring expensive debt, protecting collateral, or funding a pivot with clear returns—it could still rationalize support. The more likely form, however, would be structured and limited (asset-backed refinancing, selective asset sales, or ring-fenced funding), rather than a sweeping “windfall-funded rescue.”

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