SMFB Seen as Better Bet Despite GSMI’s Strong Showing

Ginebra San Miguel Inc. (GSMI) delivered another stellar performance for the first nine months of 2025, posting ₱48.66 billion in sales, up 7% year-on-year, and ₱6.35 billion in net income, a 17% increase from last year. Earnings per share surged to ₱22.17, and the company declared a total of ₱16.00 per share in dividends for the year, reinforcing its reputation as a high-yield play in the spirits segment.

Yet, analysts point to San Miguel Food & Beverage, Inc. (SMFB) as the more compelling investment choice. Here’s why:

Higher Dividend Yield

While GSMI boasts a generous payout, its dividend yield stands at ~5.7% based on current prices. SMFB, on the other hand, offers ~6.6–6.7%, thanks to steady quarterly dividends and occasional specials. For income-focused investors, SMFB’s yield advantage is hard to ignore.

Diversified Earnings Base

GSMI is a single-segment player, heavily reliant on gin and other spirits. SMFB consolidates beer, spirits, and food businesses, providing multiple growth levers and reducing exposure to market volatility in any one category.

GSMI’s Success Flows Up to SMFB

SMFB owns 75.78% of GSMI, meaning the bulk of GSMI’s strong earnings and hefty dividends ultimately accrue to SMFB. Investors in SMFB gain indirect exposure to GSMI’s growth plus the performance of other profitable units like San Miguel Brewery and San Miguel Foods.

Scale and Stability

SMFB’s larger revenue base and diversified operations offer resilience against cyclical swings. Its lower share price (~₱52.50 vs. GSMI’s ~₱279) also makes it more accessible and liquid for retail investors.

Bottom Line

GSMI remains a solid performer with robust profitability and consistent payouts. However, for investors seeking higher yield, diversification, and long-term stability, SMFB stands out as the better bet.

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