PAL Holdings Posts Strong Nine-Month Results, But Share Liquidity Remains a Concern

PAL Holdings, Inc., the parent company of Philippine Airlines, reported robust financial results for the nine months ended September 30, 2025, signaling renewed investor confidence in the flag carrier’s turnaround story. The company posted a net income of ₱9.88 billion, up 22.4% from ₱8.08 billion in the same period last year, while total comprehensive income surged 17.8% to ₱10.14 billion.

Revenues climbed to ₱136.01 billion, driven by higher ancillary income and cargo operations. Ancillary revenues jumped 23.7%, reflecting strong demand for seat upgrades and other services, while cargo revenue rose 3.6%. Operating expenses increased modestly by 3.97%, aided by lower fuel costs and vendor credits related to grounded aircraft.

The company’s balance sheet also improved, with debt-to-equity ratio dropping to 1.51 from 1.87, signaling reduced financial risk. Equity rose to ₱53.03 billion, a 23.7% increase from year-end 2024.

“PAL’s performance underscores its resilience and strategic execution,” analysts noted, citing strong cash flows and ongoing fleet modernization plans, including orders for Airbus A350-1000 and A321 NEO aircraft.

The Setback: Illiquid Shares

Despite the upbeat fundamentals, PAL Holdings faces a key hurdle for investors: low share liquidity. While the company is listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange with 25.76 billion shares, trading activity remains thin. Recent sessions saw volumes as low as 1,000 shares traded, equivalent to just ₱3,800 in value, although occasional spikes occur during news-driven events.

This illiquidity means large buy or sell orders could significantly move prices, posing challenges for institutional investors and active traders. Analysts warn that while PAL’s fundamentals make it attractive, liquidity constraints may limit entry and exit flexibility.

Investor Outlook

PAL Holdings appears fundamentally investable given its profitability rebound, improved leverage, and growth trajectory. However, prospective investors should weigh liquidity risks and consider strategies such as limit orders or long-term positioning to mitigate execution challenges.

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