MM has priced in the promise of a future, how long can the market hold on to that promise?

MM is now trading at 3 times its IPO price of 1.00 a share. It is just two months since the IPO but its shares is already 3 times the IPO price and this is despite the fact that the IPO proceeds has not yet been fully used. Clearly the market has priced in the future prospect of the MM business.

Groceries and convenience stores are capital intensive and low margin businesses and those are the businesses of MM. Established player in this industry are PGOLD, MRSGI, SM, RRHI, and SEVN. The proceeds of the IPO once deployed maybe will be able to add a handful to a dozen operating stores. The additional stores will only produced marginal income for MM.

The key revenue actually for MM is the franchise fee. The margin for that is almost a 100% percent. But for now that revenue is still a footnote in the other operating income.

The COVID-19 pandemic if we take note of the events around us is battering strong the small and medium enterprises all over the country. Banks are tightening the lending standards against this segment. We believe this is the target market of MM for the franchise business. In a fine environment these entrepreneurs will have the capital and the willingness to go and get a franchise for a grocery or a convenience store. We don’t have a conclusive data on how the small and medium businesses are doing right now but by just looking around you can see that many are conserving capital.

We believe that the franchise fee revenue will take a significant period of time for it to become the main revenue line. For now its just a footnote in the other operating income.

Let’s just hope the market won’t wake up to the present reality.

MM’s P/E is 314 compared to that of PGOLD-20.27 and MRSGI-16.11.

Disclaimer: This is an independent analysis for discussion purposes with the aim of giving stock traders and investors an independent perspective. Accuretti Systems Inc. does not hold any MM, MRSGI, PGOLD, SM, RRHI, and SEVN shares.

Comments

The Ayalas didn’t “lose” Alabang Town Center—They cashed out like disciplined capital allocators

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! If you only read the headline—Ayala Land exits Alabang Town Center (ATC)—you might mistake it for a retreat, or worse, a concession to the Madrigal–Bayot clan. But the paper trail tells a more nuanced story: the Ayalas weren’t unwilling to buy out the Madrigals; they simply didn’t need to—and didn’t want to at that price, at that point in the cycle. And that’s exactly where the contrast with the Lopezes begins. In late December 2025, Lopez-controlled Rockwell Land stepped in to buy a controlling 74.8% stake in the ATC-owning company for ₱21.6 billion—explicitly pitching long-term redevelopment upside as the prize. A week earlier, Ayala Land (ALI) signed an agreement to sell its 50% stake for ₱13.5 billion after an unsolicited premium offer —and said it would redeploy proceeds into its leasing growth pipeline and return of capital to stakeholders. Same asset. Two mindsets. 1) Why buy what you already co...

From Meralco to Rockwell: How the Lopezes Restructured to Put Rockwell Land Under FPH’s Control

The Big Picture In the span of just a few years, the Lopez family executed a complex corporate restructuring that shifted Rockwell Land Corporation firmly under First Philippine Holdings Corporation (FPH) —even as they parted with “precious” equity in Manila Electric Company (Meralco) to make it happen. The strategy wove together property dividends, special block sales, and the monetization of legacy assets, ultimately consolidating one of the Philippines’ most admired property brands inside the Lopezes’ flagship holding company. Laying the Groundwork (1996–2009) Rockwell began as First Philippine Realty and Development Corporation and was rebranded Rockwell Land in 1995. A pivotal capital infusion in September 1996 brought in three major shareholders— Meralco , FPH , and Benpres (now Lopez Holdings) —setting up a tripartite structure that would endure for more than a decade. By August 2009 , the Lopezes made a decisive move: Benpres sold its 24.5% Rockwell stake...

Lopez, Gokongwei, Gatchalian, Romualdez: The PCIBank Boardroom Drama

By early 1999, PCIBank had become more than one of the Philippines’ largest lenders; it had become a test of whether a major bank could remain stable when its ownership rested on a fragile balance between two business clans. Publicly accessible historical sources identify Eugenio Lopez Jr. as chairman and John Gokongwei Jr. as vice-chairman of PCIBank before the sale to Equitable, showing that the institution was effectively run through a dual-center power structure at the top. What happened beneath that formal structure is harder to document with certainty. It was allegedly governed by a shareholder arrangement between the Lopez and Gokongwei groups that allowed the two camps to share control of PCIBank, with Mr Lopez as chairman and Mr Gokongwei, though vice-chairman, allegedly exercising influence through the bank’s executive committee. We have not found the actual shareholder agreement in the public sources reviewed here, so that part of the story should be trea...

the Outsider - PSE Points to Ponder

Search This Blog