the Outsider - PSE Points to Ponder

  In the Philippines’ largest conglomerates, the most important businesses are not always the ones on the billboards. At the parent-company level, the Gokongweis, the Aboitizes and the Consunjis all leaned in 2025 on a quieter engine of wealth: dividends remitted from electricity and water franchises, or from utility-like assets built to throw off cash with a regularity consumer brands, property and cyclical industrials often cannot match.  That matters because listed holding companies ultimately live on upstream cash. Their job is not simply to own assets, but to convert those assets into funds that can service debt, pay shareholders and finance the next round of bets. By that measure, 2025 offered a striking lesson in how the country’s old-line business families now make money: the parent-level cash machine is increasingly powered by regulated or utility-style franchises, not just by food, real estate, airlines or construction.  For JG Summit Holdings Inc. , the surpris...

  For all the noise around property, construction, and cement, the cash heartbeat of the Consunji empire still comes from utility-style assets: Semirara Mining and Power Corp. and Maynilad. In 2025, those two businesses once again anchored the group’s earnings and helped explain how DMCI Holdings kept one of the Philippine market’s richest payouts alive even as profits retreated from post-crisis highs.   By the numbers, the story is straightforward. DMCI Holdings’ biggest attributable earnings contributor in 2025 was Semirara Mining and Power Corp. (SMPC) at ₱7.324 billion , while Maynilad contributed ₱3.681 billion , making the water concessionaire one of the group’s largest profit engines alongside DMCI Homes. Management itself said SMPC, Maynilad, and DMCI Homes accounted for 95% of group net income , an unusually high concentration that underscores how much the holding company still depends on a few cash-generative assets.  That concentration matters because DMCI, f...

The Department of Energy deserves credit for insisting on a competitive rebidding of the Semirara coal blocks instead of granting an outright extension to Semirara Mining and Power Corporation’s current coal operating contract, which expires in July 2027. The DOE has made clear that the Semirara area will be included in the 2026 coal bid round, and that awards will be based on technical, financial, legal, and work-program qualifications rather than on a simple highest-bid-wins formula.  That is the right policy. But good policy does not guarantee intense competition. The more difficult question is whether many serious players will actually want to commit capital to a coal asset at a time when the economics of coal are no longer what they were just a few years ago. Semirara’s own results suggest the answer may be more complicated than the optics of an open auction imply. Coal is clearly no longer in the 2022–2024 supercycle conditions. In 2025, Semirara Mining and Power Corporation ...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! Disclaimer:  This is for informational purposes and is  not  investment advice. Figures are taken from company disclosures and exchange data; valuation ratios include the author’s calculations based on cited inputs. Wars don’t just move armies—they move molecules . And when energy trade routes start pricing in disruption, governments quickly rediscover a political constant: nothing tests public patience faster than rising electricity prices . The ongoing US–Iran conflict has heightened uncertainty around the Strait of Hormuz—one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints—raising the risk premium on delivered crude and LNG through a mix of shipping hesitation, security risk, and insurance repricing. For the Philippines, the consequence is immediate: when imported fuels reprice higher, the government’s room for policy experiments narrows. That shifts the calculus around a seemingly technical ...

We have earlier commented that the COVID-19 pandemic had a significant adverse impact on the operations and finances of DMCI Holdings, Inc. ( DMC ) during the first half of 2020 (1H 2020) which resulted to a weaker financial footing for DMC as of end of 1H 2020 . The weakness in the results of DMC sent it shares plummeting to a low of 3.40 a share almost revisiting the 3.10 a share low at the height of the sell down in March 2020. The Consunji’s took advantage of the weakness in the share price of DMC, accumulating DMC shares along the way. We have commented earlier that the Consunji’s private holding company, DFC Holdings, Inc., had accumulated a total of 55,425,100 DMC shares as of the end of August 2020 . It appears now that DFC Holdings is not yet done accumulating DMC shares. For the first two weeks of September 2020, DFC Holdings bought 3,892,000 DMC shares. The Consunji’s accumulation of DMC shares signals that they have the operational and financial expertis...