the Outsider - PSE Points to Ponder

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! Market Commentary — A cautious read on Alliance Global Group (AGI) Alliance Global Group’s latest disclosures offer a familiar comfort to shareholders: profits are up, margins are wider, and the company is still buying back shares . Yet caution is warranted. In the near term, AGI’s buyback may serve more as a shock absorber than a launchpad, as the group also navigates heavy investment spending, rising net debt, and corporate actions that can complicate sentiment. Earnings strength is real—but the headline is not “pure” For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, AGI reported ₱24.85 billion in net profit (+23.9% YoY) and ₱17.39 billion net profit attributable to owners (+34.0% YoY) —a strong set of results on paper. EBITDA rose to ₱46.35 billion , and the company’s reported margins expanded meaningfully. But that same report also shows revenues and income down 11.3% year-on-year to ₱143.37 billion ....

  How A. Soriano Corp. evolved from 2019 to September 2025—and kept paying shareholders through a volcano, a pandemic, and volatile markets We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! MANILA — A. Soriano Corporation (ANSCOR) doesn’t fit the stereotype of a headline-chasing conglomerate. It’s a quiet holding company: part industrial operator, part luxury tourism owner, part financial investor. Yet from 2019 through September 2025 , it has done something that makes income-focused investors sit up: it kept returning meaningful cash dividends even as the economy whipsawed from pre-pandemic expansion to lockdown collapse to reopening euphoria—and then to a new era of rate shocks and geopolitical uncertainty.  Behind that steadiness is a simple playbook: cash-generating operating businesses to anchor the base, a diversified investment portfolio to amplify cycles, a conservative balance sheet to avoid forced selling, and disciplined capital allo...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! There’s a comforting myth that public shareholders always have options: hold, sell, wait for better value, vote, pressure management. In ordinary industries, that’s often true. In port concessions , it’s closer to fiction. Here, the core assets are not factories or patents but government-granted operating rights , governed by contracts, policy, and regulators. ATI itself underscores that its authority to manage and operate key ports rests on its contracts and the administrative rules of government agencies—particularly the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and other regulators. In that setting, the company’s long-term survival depends less on quarterly earnings and more on maintaining state confidence that the operator can deliver national logistics outcomes. That is why the strategic conclusion—unpleasant for purists but obvious to realists—is this: Eusebio Tanco has to partner with Maharlika . Not becaus...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! When Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) went into a voluntary trading suspension, and headlines quickly shifted to a ₱36-per-share tender offer tied to a Maharlika Investment Corp. (MIC) entry, the market’s real debate wasn’t just about price—it was about time . Time to lock in value for public shareholders, and time to de-risk a business whose most valuable assets are, in the end, government-granted contracts .  MIC’s planned purchase—reported as up to 11.2% of ATI alongside a tender offer covering public float shares—has an explicit objective: voluntary delisting . And delisting changes the fairness calculus: shareholders aren’t just selling a stock; they’re being offered a regulated exit from an increasingly illiquid public market as the free float shrinks below listing thresholds.  Fairness is not just a premium—it’s a package Tender offer “fairness” is usually judged by three factors: (1) price ...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! By mid-December, DDMP REIT (PSE: DDMPR ) holders are used to a familiar ritual: a dividend declaration that sets the stage for a January record date and a February payout. Last year, that rhythm was clear—DDMPR’s board approved a regular cash dividend on December 13, 2024 , with payment on February 14, 2025 .  This year, the ritual has been interrupted. As of December 17, 2025 , there is no visible declared upcoming dividend for DDMPR in commonly referenced dividend trackers, and the PSE’s dividend listings excerpted for upcoming distributions do not show a DDMPR entry. The last clearly documented DDMPR dividend event remains the board-approved cash dividend dated September 30, 2025 , paid November 26, 2025 In markets, silence is rarely neutral —especially when investors have been conditioned to expect a quarterly paycheck. Why the Delay Feels Bigger Than It Is REITs trade on a promise: predictable cas...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! When cash flow, not earnings, becomes the real referee—especially in a slowing economy. RFM’s December 16, 2025 press release reads like a victory lap: the company is “on track” for ₱22.2 billion in full‑year sales and ₱1.6 billion in net income, while planning to distribute ₱1.5 billion in cash dividends for 2025—highlighting a year‑end ₱500 million payout and emphasizing that the group is “very liquid,” with zero loans at the parent company level . On the surface, this is the classic income‑investor story: steady brands, resilient demand, and a confident dividend posture.  But the more sobering companion document is the company’s SEC 17‑Q for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 , which suggests that repeating the same dividend intensity in 2026 could be a taller order—particularly if the Philippine economy remains soft. The reason is simple and often overlooked: dividends are paid in cash , a...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! Victorias Milling Company, Inc. (VMC) reported higher consolidated revenues for the fiscal year ended Aug. 31, 2025 , but operating cash flow fell sharply as more cash became tied up in receivables, inventories, and other current assets —a working-capital squeeze that investors will likely monitor closely into the next crop year. Top-line growth, profit softer In its annual report (SEC Form 17‑A), VMC said consolidated revenues rose to ₱12.68 billion , up about 11.5% from ₱11.38 billion a year earlier, supported by higher power revenues from increased generation and export volumes, partly offset by softer refined sugar sales. Net income, however, declined to ₱1.35 billion from ₱1.55 billion , reflecting margin pressures and higher operating costs. The company’s gross profit margin compressed to roughly 15% from about 16% previously, as cost of sales rose faster than revenues. Management pointed to ele...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! RFM Corporation’s December 16 press release reads like a classic year‑end confidence note: ₱22.2B in full‑year 2025 sales , a targeted ₱1.6B net income , and a headline‑friendly ₱1.5B cash dividend program capped by a ₱500M payout scheduled for Dec. 19 . Management also leans on a comfort phrase investors love—“very liquid”—and highlights that the parent company carries zero loans , a rarity in consumer goods. The message is clear: profits are steady, cash is ample, and dividends are part of the identity. But when you put that upbeat narrative beside the company’s 9M 2025 SEC 17‑Q , a more nuanced picture emerges—one that many income investors learn the hard way: profits and operating cash flow are cousins, not twins . Through September 30, 2025, RFM posted ₱1.252B in net income, yet net cash generated from operations collapsed to ₱141M, down sharply from ₱1.304B in the prior-year  period. In other wor...

We’ve been blogging for free. If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us! When Benpres Holdings Corp. (now Lopez Holdings Corp.) exited PCIBank in 1999, management sold the transaction as a strategic reset: redeploy capital toward “communications and utilities” and fund an emerging convergence play spanning broadcast, cable, telecoms, and infrastructure. Benpres later said outright that it sold PCIBank to focus on these core businesses, booking a one-time gain that helped cushion other one-off charges in the group’s portfolio. But the market’s memory of what came after the bank exit is less tidy. Two of the headline investments that stood to benefit most from the pivot— Bayan Telecommunications (Bayantel) and Maynilad Water Services, Inc. —both later entered court-supervised rehabilitation (and, in Maynilad’s case, a concession breakdown and arbitration that effectively ended the original operating path under the earlier shareholder group). That history matters again today as t...